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I.

INTRODUCTION

These are our only remaining homelands. We have to protect
hem. Eno gh s eno gh.
Jodi Gillette, Fmr. White House Advisor on Native American
Affairs.1
The history of Indigenous2 resistance in the United States
predates the establishment of the country itself. 3 Before the Thirteen
Colonies even formed a government, Indigenous peoples of North
America were pushing back against European whites infiltrating or
outright conquering territories Indigenous people had resided in for
centuries.4 Even during the height of Manifest Destiny, Indigenous
people continued their rebellion against the federal government,
through actions ranging from Indigenous protest of the laying in of
railroads across the western United States 5 to the American Indian
Movement of the 1960s and 1970s.6
The 2010s have marked an upsurge in Indigenous resistance
and protest, particularly in the realm of environmental law. The
#NoDAPL protests in North Dakota may be the most famous
example of this phenomenon. 7 Multiple protestors (who came to be
a Wa e P ec
) e a
fede a c
d
da ,
Divided Films, Mni Wiconi: The Stand at Standing Rock, YOUTUBE (Nov. 14,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4FDuqYld8C8
[https://perma.cc/K5Z7-2S9J].
2 It must be unequivocally stated that I am white, not Indigenous. I am
deliberately choosing to use the term Indigenous to describe the First Peoples of
the United States, rather than Indian, Native American, or Native, for both
personal reasons and for purposes of consistency throughout the paper. In
circumstances where the te
f Na e A e ca
I da
be
used ex. the Indian Civil Rights Act it is for ease of recognition by readers
and academics. Similarly, by writing on this topic I am attempting to utilize the
societal privilege I have been granted, as a white person who was able to attend
both university and law school, to bring awareness to issues that may not
otherwise be discussed. I do not wish to be credited for the fantastic work of
Indigenous environmental protestors around the world, and if anything in this
paper is offensive or egregious to anyone, please feel free to contact me at
alixbruce@protonmail.com.
3 See generally ROXANNE DUNBAR-ORTIZ, AN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES (2014).
4 See id.
5 DINA GILIO-WHITAKER, AS LONG AS GRASS GROWS 58 (2019).
6 See generally DENNIS BANKS WITH RICHARD ERDOES, OJIBWA WARRIOR:
DENNIS BANKS AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT (2004); see
generally VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS (1969).
7 GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 3-10.
1
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including Red Fawn Fallis, who was sentenced to almost five years
of prison time for possession of a weapon brought into the Water
Protector camp by an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.8
Similar examples of resistance include Indigenous defenders of
Bears Ears Monument in Utah; Standing Rock veterans protesting
the Line 5 installation in Michigan in Camp Anishinaabek; Water
P ec
L
a a a he L ea E V e ( Wa e
L fe ) ca
standing against the Bayou Bridge Pipeline; and Society of Native
Nations members protesting the installation of the Kinder Morgan
Pipeline in San Antonio, Texas. 9 Indigenous peoples have been and
continue to be on the front lines of peaceful protest in the United
States.
However, in the wake of these massive protests, state
governments across the nation have begun to enact laws that curtail
or outright prohibit protest. At the time of this writing, more than
100 bills have been considered or enacted across the United States,
with nine states enshrining anti-protest edicts into law: Indiana,
Louisiana, Missouri, North and South Dakota, Oklahoma,
Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. 10 Other states, including
Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Jersey, North and South Carolina, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania, have anti-protest legislation up for consideration.
These proposed laws range in topic from imposing mandatory
Will Parrish, An Activist Stands Accused of Firing a Gun at Standing Rock. It
Belonged to Her Lover An FBI Informant., THE INTERCEPT (Dec. 11, 2017,
4:11 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/12/11/standing-rock-dakota-accesspipeline-fbi-informant-red-fawn-fallis/ [https://perma.cc/J4L4-GL9M].
9 Joe Fox et al., What Remains of Bears Ears, THE WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/national/bearsears/?utm_term=.cc5e5fd1d014 [https://perma.cc/7ZPH-L23D]; Gina Kaufman
and Robert Allen, Standing Rock protestors now protesting Line 5 pipeline,
DETROIT FREE PRESS (Aug. 11, 2018, 7:17 PM),
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2018/08/11/standing-rockprotesters-line-5-pipeline/968405002/ [https://perma.cc/BPA8-PGEA]; Levi
Rickert, Four Water Protectors Arrested at Bayou Bridge Pipeline Construction
Site, NATIVE NEWS ONLINE (Sept. 5, 2018),
https://nativenewsonline.net/currents/four-water-protectors-arrested-at-bayoubridge-pipeline-construction-site/ [https://perma.cc/NW8S-YLUW]; Frank
Hopper, Kill he bill! Sa e he land! Na i e pro ec ors disr p Te as
legislature, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (May 10, 2019),
https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/news/kill-the-bill-save-the-landnative-protectors-disrupt-texas-legislature-qNlvwX7lPkeLgU5y6wJVpw
[https://perma.cc/ZXB7-EEJS].
10 US Protest Law Tracker, Enacted Bills, INT L CTR. FOR NOT-F OR-PROFIT L.,
.http://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker/?location=&status=enacted&issue=&d
ate=&type=legislative [https://perma.cc/VCD6-59LU].
8
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sanctions for campus protestors (SB 33, North Carolina) to
expanding the definition of a riot (AB 2853, New Jersey), expanding
the definition for unlawful assembly (HB 288, Missouri), or
prohibiting masked demonstrations (HD 2639, Massachusetts). 11
The most troubling of these anti-protest laws are those that
penalize protests near gas and oil pipelines.12 Frequently described
b
a e eg a e a
e a e f
e
ea c ca
f a c e, he e a
c
a e
e
ea ga
pipelines, including those under construction at the time of the
protest.13 Although these laws may not expressly target Indigenous
peoples, the implications of the laws inevitably prevent Indigenous
peoples from exercising their First Amendment Rights.
Part I of this paper provides a timeline of protests and First
Amendment law in the United States, describing the First
A e d e
de e
e a d c ec
he D e P ce
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and its progression to the
current era. Part II examines the application and provision of civil
rights to Indigenous communities in the United States, including the
application of First Amendment rights to Indigenous peoples. Part
III describes the #NoDAPL protests in North Dakota, their political
impact, and the resulting wave of anti-protest laws. Part III will also
provide an overview of anti-protest laws in five states, focusing
specifically on laws being enacted or debated in North and South
Dakota, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Texas, as well as the newest
ed fede a a
ec g aga
c ca
fa c e
destruction. Part IV links these anti-protest laws to the long history
of chilling of Indigenous free speech and stifling of Indigenous civil
rights in the United States, particularly by exploring the way each
law violates the First Amendment. Part V considers the
consequences of these anti-protest laws not only on Indigenous
peoples, but on the United States as a whole. Finally, Part VI
provides recommendations on how the United States can repair
these issues and perhaps move forward more in line with the goals
of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
US Protest Law Tracker, INT L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT L.,
http://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker/ [https://perma.cc/HZE7-5UGN].
12 US Protest Law Tracker, Pending Bills, INT L CTR. FOR NOT-F OR-PROFIT L.,
.http://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker/?location=&status=pending&issue=&d
ate=&type=legislative [https://perma.cc/YN7Q-ZLE5].
13 See American Legislative Exchange Council, Critical Infrastructure
Protection Act, ALEC, https://www.alec.org/model-policy/criticalinfrastructure-protection-act/ [https://perma.cc/2J36-P7UN].
11
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Pe
II.

e (he eaf e

UNDRIP ).

AN OVERVIEW OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution
a e ha : C g e ha
a e
a e ec g a e ab h e
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
f g e a ce . 14 Legal applications of the First Amendment are
varied, with the interpretations of the various clauses by the
Supreme Court changing depending on era and cultural norms. To
better understand how critical infrastructure/anti-protest laws
violate the First Amendment rights of Indigenous peoples, the
applicable case law of both freedom of speech and freedom of
association must be explored.
Freedom of Speech
The h
f he S e e C
e a
a
f he F
A e d e da e bac a
e fec
he F
A e d e
drafting and addition to the U.S. Constitution in 1791; the
application of First Amendment protections continue to be a highly
litigated area of law. 15 When it comes to freedom of expression,
which encompasses both freedom of speech and freedom of the
press (only tangentially relevant here), the Supreme Court has
established, edited, and transformed a series of tests to apply to state
or federal laws which seek to regulate free speech to determine their
constitutionality. The clear and present danger test, established in
1941 with Thornhill v. Alabama16 and ending in 1951 with Dennis
v. United States 17, attempted to put forward the idea that First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and expression could only
be ab dged f he e a [a] c ea a d e e da ge f de c
of right or property, or invasion of the right of privacy, or breach of
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
American Legion v. American Humanist Assn., 139 S.Ct. 2067, 204 L.Ed.2d
452 (2019); Bill of Rights (1791), OUR DOCUMENTS,
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=13
[https://perma.cc/4VDK-6XMZ].
16 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
17 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
14
15
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the peace that can be thought to be inherent in the activities of every
e
. . . 18 Under this rule, free speech would be protected by the
courts so long as the exercise of that right to free speech did not
endanger, harm, or result in endangering or harming people or
property. As presented in Thornhill, a case dealing with antipicketing laws, so long as people or property (like a pipeline) were
not harmed in a person exercising their right to free speech, that free
speech was legal and protected. 19
However, the clear and present danger test was transformed
b J ce F a f e
c c e ce
Dennis. Rather than
continue using the clear and present danger test, Justice
Fa f e
c c e ce
gge ed he
e e a
f a
balancing test one which required courts to examine laws or cases
that might violate free speech by considering whethe he g a
f he e , d c
ed b
bab
,
fe
ch
a
f f ee eech a
ece a
a d he da ge . 20
J ce F a f e ba a c g e
a
ed h gh
he
1950s and 1960s, until the lines began to blur because the Supreme
Court used the balancing test in some cases 21 but not others.22 The
test slowly transformed into a concept of examining vagueness or
he
e b ead h f a a a he ha
ba a c g, a Ch ef
J dge Lea ed Ha d
e, he g a
f he e
h he
infringement on free speech. 23 In 1997, the Supreme Court in Reno
v. American Civil Liberties Union (he eaf e Reno ) a ed ha a
e b ad a
gh be c ed f
c
a
b
e e g
[a] term . . . pursuant to its se e ab
c a e. 24 In Virginia v. Hicks
(he eaf e Hicks ), he S e e C
de e
ed ha a a e
h ch a h
ed he R ch
d
ce
e e
ce
a
e
ac g a eg
aeb
e
ca
e f be g
on the property of a low income housing development in Richmond,
Virginia was not overbroad. 25 The Supreme Court in Hicks stated
that:
The h
g ha a a
he a
b a a
Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 105.
Id.
20 183 F.2d 201, 212 (1950), cited in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. at 510.
21See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1
(1961).
22See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
23 183 F.2d at 212.
24 521 U.S. 844, 844 (1997).
25 539 U.S. 113, 113 (2003).
18
19
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a

f

ec ed f ee eech, dged
ea
he a e
a
eg
a e ee , ff ce
invalidate all e f ce e
f ha a ,
a d
unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation
so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or
deterrence
to
constitutionally
protected
e e
. 26
The Supreme Court
de h e ed
f c ce ha he
h ea f e f ce e
f a
e b ad a
a de e
ch
constitutionally protected speech especially when the overbroad
a e
e c
a a c
. 27 This does not mean that a law
should not be enforced so long as it has a legitimate purpose in
a a
gc
ehe
ec
e ha f , c
a
ec ed c d c . 28 However, if a law, federal or state,
sufficiently chills free speech to the point where people will choose
not to exercise that free speech because of potential criminal
consequences, then that law should be severed, amended, or
invalidated as it may become necessary.29
The Supreme Court will also frequently examine whether a
law is sufficiently precise to ensure that any action taken in the
course of the exercise of free speech may be potentially criminal
conduct.30 Specifically in regards to public demonstrations or
protests, vagueness can be combined with the examination of a
statute as being potentially overbroad. 31 National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People v. Button will be discussed further
Id. at 119 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. (c
g B ad c . O ah a, 413 U.S. a 615) (f
g
h [f]
there are substantial social costs created by the overbreadth doctrine. . . [t]o
ensure that these costs do not swallow the social benefits of declaring a law
e b ad, e ha e
ed ha a a
a
ca
ec ed eech be
b a a,
a ab
e e e, b a
ea e
he c e f he
a
a
eg
aea
ca
. . . bef e a
g he
g ed c e
f e b ead h
a da
, 119-120).
30 See Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926); Village of Hoffman
Estates v. The Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
31 Na
A
f Ad a ce e
fC
ed Pe e (NAACP) . B
, 371
U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963) (examining the constitutionality of Chapter 33 of the
V g a Ac f A e b , h ch
h b ed
c a
f ega b
e b a
e
ca e
c de,
he def
[ ] . . . a age f a
d d a
or organization which retains a lawyer in connection with an action to which it is
a a a d
h ch ha
ec a
gh
ab
, h ch he C
held unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
26
27
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below in terms of freedom of association, but it provides the most
c ge de c
f he S e e C
d c e ega d g
vagueness or overbreadth. According to the Supreme Court, the
consequences of a law which is either overly vague or overly broad
can be immense; in NAACP v. Button, Justice Brennan states:
The objectionable quality of vagueness and
overbreadth does not depend on absence of fair
notice . . . but upon the danger of tolerating, in the
area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of
a penal statute susceptible to sweeping and improper
application. These freedoms are delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious . . .
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently
as the actual application of sanctions. 32
The use of vague language or overbreadth in a statute limiting free
speech is not limited, like in other constitutional questions, to
whether the statute provides fair notice of whether a criminal act
could be committed. Rather, as per Justice Brennan, the overbreadth
or vagueness of the statute itself could result in the criminalization
of protected speech.
Perhaps one of the most significant cases in the context of
this issue is Brandenburg v. Ohio, decided by the Supreme Court in
1969.33 The defendant in Brandenburg, a member of the Ku Klux
Klan in Ohio, had been convicted under the Ohio Criminal
S d ca
Ac , h ch c
a ed he ad ca [ g] he d ,
necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful
methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or
ca ef
. 34 After inviting a television crew to attend a group
ee g, he defe da
a ed a
e
ha
b e that
he e
gh ha e
be
e e e gea ce [ c] a e
he
President, Congress, and the Supreme Court for recent decisions
during the Civil Rights era. 35 The Oh S e e C
aff a
f he a c
c
a
e
ed b he S e e
Court, which stated that:

Id.
395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969).
34 Id. at 444-45 (citing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.13).
35 Id. at 446.
32
33
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[We] have fashioned the principle that the
constitutional guarantees of free speech . . . do not
permit a state to forbid or proscribe the advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action. As we said in Noto v. United
States, he e e ab ac each g f the moral
propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force
and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for
e ac
a d ee g
ch ac
.
[Citations omitted.] A statute which fails to draw this
distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the
freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. It sweeps within its condemnation
speech which our Constitution has immunized from
governmental control. [Citations omitted.] 36
The Supreme Court continued by stating that the Ohio Criminal
Syndicalism Act violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as
h e e ad cac a d
f b d,
a
f
criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the
de c bed e f ac
. 37 The Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act had
c
a ed he ad cac f
e ce a a ea
f acc
h g
d
a
ca ef
. 38
It is apropos to mention that while the intent of the lower
courts in this case was to convict a Klansman who had been
advocating the overthrow of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches, the end result was unconstitutional. 39 Thus, state laws
which interfere with the freedom of speech, even if that speech
advocates use of force or violation of the law, are unconstitutional
when that speech does not incite the use of force or breaking the
law.40 To regulate free speech, a legislature must weigh the intent of
the speaker, the likelihood of violence being the result of the speech,
or the actual imminence of the possible violence which are critical
in regulating free speech. Laws which infringe on these things
Id. at 447-48.
Id. at 449.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 446, 449.
40 Id. at 449.
36
37
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without just cause are unconstitutional. 41
Freedom of Association
Freedom of association is inherently linked to and derived
from freedom of speech. 42 In 1958, the Supreme Court reasoned in
National Association for Advancement of Colored People v. State of
Alabama that group association inherently enhances advocacy of
both public and private concerns. 43 The Supreme Court in NAACP
v. Alabama a ed ha
a e a hether the beliefs sought
to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic,
religious or cultural matters, and state action which may have the
effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest
c
. 44
The Supreme Court further established in Kusper v. Pontikes
that the freedom to associate with like-minded people, especially in
political contexts, is protected by both the First Amendment and the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that showing a legitimate state interest
alone is not enough to justify encroaching on it. 45 This link between
the First Amendment and the Fourteenth is based entirely in the
concept of liberty as put forward by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment
states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the states wherein they
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
Complaint, Dakota Rural Action et al. v. Kristi Noem et al., Case No. 5:19-cv5046 (W.D. S.D., Mar. 28, 2019), *7.
42 See Na
A
f he Ad a ce e
fC
ed Pe e (NAACP) v. State of
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
43 Id. a 460 ( a
g ha [e]ffec e ad cac f b h b c a d
ae
of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group
a ca
).
44 Id. at 460-61.
45 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973) ( a
g ha [ ]he gh
a cae
h he
ca a
f e ch ce a
eg a a f h ba c c
a
f eed
).
41
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jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.46
The Supreme Court explained in NAACP v. Alabama that the First
and Fourteenth Amendments are inherently linked, because the
F
ee h A e d e
e b ace f eed
f eech. Ca e
involving freedom of association usually examine laws restricting
political parties: the construction or limitation of political parties,
how they choose candidates, how its membership is limited, and
other issues. However, particularly in NAACP v. Alabama, freedom
of association comes into play with non-profit organizations in
regards to membership lists in organizations.47 It is within the right
of a private organization, like the NAACP, to not be required to
d c e e be h
f he
ga a
; []
f
ae c
. . .
e a ed
he gh f [ he NAACP ]
members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to
associate freely with others in doing so as to come within the
ec
f he F
ee h A e d e . 48 State and federal
governments cannot compel non-profit associations, political
parties, labor unions, or other groups to disclose their associations
h d d a
e be , a
a c
e a effec e a
restraint on freedom of association . . . [t]his Supreme Court has
recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and
ac
e a ca
. 49
NAACP v. Alabama was followed five years later by NAACP
v. Button, which further analyzed the actions and activities of
organizations to determine whether they were protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.50 In NAACP v. Button, the state of
Virginia had drafted and passed a new chapter of the Virginia legal
c de, Cha e 33, ha e e ed a
d f
e
ca e
to solicit legal business.51 Th
c ded
he def
f
e
ca e , a age f a
d d a
ga ation
which retains a lawyer in connection with an action to which it is
a a a d
h ch ha
ec a
gh
ab
. 52 The
NAACP rightly claimed that the addition of this chapter in Virginia

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
NAACP, 357 U.S. at 450.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 462.
50 Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
51 Id. at 423-24.
52 Id.
46
47
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a
f ge[d] he gh f he NAACP a d its members and
lawyers to associate for the purpose of assisting persons who seek
legal redress for infringements of their constitutionally guaranteed
a d he gh . 53 The context and wording of Chapter 33 ensured
that any person who informs another that they have experienced an
infringement on their legal rights and recommends that they speak
to an attorney or specific legal group has committed a crime. 54
Chapter 33 was found to be both vague and overbroad due to its lack
of definition of illegal activity and its prevention of association
protected by the First Amendment. 55 The Supreme Court also found
Cha e 33
a ed he F
ee h A e d e b
d
hb g
ec ed f eed
fe e
a d a ca
. 56 In
his majority opinion, Justice Brennan wrote that:
[A] State cannot foreclose the exercise of
constitutional rights by mere labels . . . [A]bstract
discussion is not the only species of communication
which the Constitution protects; the First
Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy,
certainly of lawful ends, against governmental
intrusion. [Citations omitted.] . . . [L]itigation is not
a technique of solving private differences; it is a
means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality
of treatment by all government, federal, state and
local . . . [and] is thus a form of political expression. 57
Following the determination in NAACP v. Alabama that it is a
constitutional right for people to associate with each other to
advance ideas or beliefs, the Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment protects not just individual association or the right of
people to gather in unions or political parties, but the actions of
litigation groups in associating with people who need legal
assistance.58 The First Amendment right to freedom of association,
then, protects not only the right of individuals to associate in groups
advocating for political action, but also the right of non-profit and
Id. at 428.
Id. at 434.
55 Id. at 435.
56 Id. at 437.
57 Id. at 429.
58 Id.
53
54
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legal aid organizations to provide aid in these contexts.
III.

CIVIL RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN THE UNITED
STATES

Kill he Indian, Sa e he Man : Indigeno s Ci il Righ s Pre1924
The relationship between Indigenous peoples and the federal
government of the United States has been fraught with racism,
imperialism, abuse, erasure, and genocide. 59 There is a plethora of
documentation regarding the mass murder, rape, assault, trauma,
and resistance of Indigenous peoples to colonial rule; to recount it
here would do an injustice to the lives and stories of Indigenous
peoples, and would take up more space than any one paper could
possibly contain.60 H e e , he e a e a ha df
f a c a ea
in the abusive relationship between the United States state and
federal governments and Indigenous peoples which provide context
to the mantle that these current era critical infrastructure/anti-protest
laws wear.
The f
f he e e a
ge e a
e ed he e ca
era, a name which evokes images of Indigenous peoples being
removed from their ancestral lands. During this era, many
Indigenous communities, tribes, and groups were ripped from their
home territories and moved across the United States in anticipation
of white immigration into the area. Legally, there were no real
repercussions. In the words of Dina Gilio-Wh a e , [ ]he c
disregard histories of dispossession . . . the action constitutes a form
of erasure and weakens the legal foundations upon which
environmental justice might otherwise be constructed.
It is difficult to describe the progression, and regression, of Indigenous civil
rights in the United States without falling into the trap of what has been
gh f
de c bed a
e
. I d ge
c
e e a
simultaneously some of the poorest, yet some of the most vibrant and politically
active, communities in the United States. However, Indigenous reservations
remain mostly under the purview of the federal government. Many treatises and
international laws have been written regarding the potential for tribal selfdetermination. The intention of this paper is to analyze current violations of
Indigenous civil and human rights under the framework in which Indigenous
peoples currently exist in the United States, and while referencing the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the focus will remain on state
and federal government violations of Indigenous civil rights.
60 See generally DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 3.
59

66

Decontextualization . . . is one way the State system fails Indigenous
e e ab
e e e ce e
e a
ce. 61
The most famous events of the relocation era are the forced
marches such as the Trail of Tears, which forcefully relocated the
Five Civilized Tribes (Cherokee, Creek, Chickasaw, Seminole, and
Choctaw) from their homelands in the Southeastern United States to
Oklahoma in 1838-39, and the Long Walk forced on the Navajo
(Diné) in 1864.62 However, displacement of Indigenous peoples
from their ancestral homelands h e a d
h ch,
a Na e
worldview . . . makes
d
c
be ee e e a d a d 63
occurred over more than a century of forced colonization of the
North American continent. 64 Native peoples were pushed out of
their territories and into distant reservations, which were divorced
entirely from their histories, customs, and cultures.65 Frequently,
instead of relocation, Indigenous people were simply killed.
Relocation continued, in other forms, throughout the years.
For example, in 1892, a man named Capt. Richard H. Pratt read
aloud a paper at a convention for like-minded men in the United
S a e . A g ea ge e a ha a d ha he
g dI da
a dead
e, he a d, . . . [ ] a e e, I ag ee . . . b
h : ha a
the Indian there is in the race should be dead. Kill the Indian . . .
a e he a . 66 Pratt is widely credited for founding the first
federally-funded, off-reservation boarding school for Indigenous
children.67 These schools were meant to strip Indigenous children of
he c
a a d fa
a de
e, c
e them to the
a da d f h e, E
ea , c
a
ce , a d h
whatever remained of Indigenous peoples post-mass colonization.68
Sch
e Pa
e e h gh e b e a c f he
ce f
assimilation inherent to the post-Civil War era.69 The Supreme
GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 57.
DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 3, at 112-14, 138-39.
63 GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 36.
64 Id. at 44-49.
65 Id.
66 Richard H. Pratt, Official Report of the Nineteenth Annual Conference of
Charities and Correction (1892), 46-59, in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN
INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN 1880-1900 260 (Francis
Paul Prucha ed., 1973).
67 Id.
68 DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 3, at 211-14.
69 Id. at 212 (quoting Sun Elk (Taos Pueblo) describing his boarding school
e e e ce: The
d
ha I d a a
e e bad . . . hey kept teaching us
for seven years. And the books told how bad the Indians had been to the white
men burning their towns and killing their women and children . . . We all wore
61
62
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Court adopted a similar viewpoint. In 1886, United States v.
Kagama cemented Indigenous territories and reservations as
subordinate to the whims of Congress, declaring that the Major
Crimes Act of 1885 which provided federal, not tribal, courts
jurisdiction over certain crimes committed in Indigenous
communities constitutional.70 Justice Miller, in his opinion, stated
that:
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They
are communities dependent on the United States,
dependent largely for their daily food; dependent for
their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the
state, and receive from them no protection . . . From
their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due
to the course of dealing with them . . . there arises a
duty of protection, and with it the power . . . The
power of the government over these remnants of a
race once powerful, now weak and diminished in
numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as
to the safety of those among whom they dwell. 71
United States rhetoric around Indigenous peoples and their
communities is and has always been both capitalistic and colonialist.
Not even the Supreme Court was exempt from this; the language in
Kagama was that of a colonizer to the conquered. To the Supreme
Court, Indigenous peoples were wards of the nation, entirely
dependent on the United States and with no real say either in the
running of their communities or on the development of the lands
they now dwelt in. 72
Kagama was quickly followed by the Dawes Act (P.L. 49119) in 1887, dividing reservation territory into individual
allotments for each Indigenous person; this has become known as
he a
e e a.73 Initially, these lots could not be sold; however,
leftover lots that is, lots that were not provided to Indigenous

h e a c he a d a e h e a f d a d e
h e
and
e h e a
a . A d , af e a h e e a bega
I da
e e bad ).
70118 U.S. 375 (1886).
71 Id. at 383-85.
72 See id.
73 The Dawes Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (repealed 2000).
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a
a

ch che
ha

people could be sold to outsiders. 74 The Dawes Act also provided
an opportunity for Indigenous people in the United States to obtain
U.S. c e h , b
f he ad ed he hab
fc
ed
fe, beca e Ch
a ed, a d e sentially abandoned their cultures
and heritage.75 Allotment would, especially in large reservations,
e
a
e
f
e e e b
-Indigenous
e e , a d,
he
d f Cha e W
, f
ce
h he
individualistic tone of American society and the assimilationist
views held by the evangelical Christians then active in Indian
c . 76 These requirements for obtaining citizenship, even to the
casual observer, violate the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of Indigenous peoples but at the time,
Indigenous peoples could not become citizens save through
ad
gc
ed fe, a d h
ee
aff ded he
ec
of the Constitution. In fact, roughly fifty years earlier, Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia (1830), had essentially closed the courts to
Indigenous peoples, regardless of the veracity or the atrocities put
forward in their legal claims.77 If be e ha he Che ee a
ha e gh ,
e J ce Ma ha , h
he b a
which those rights are to be asserted . . . this is not the tribunal which
ca ed e he a
e e he f
e. 78
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock (1903) firmly cemented the position
of Indigenous peoples as subject to the whims of Congress, opening
the doors for Congress to dismantle reservations without even
consulting with tribes.79 This resulted in the 1906 creation of the
state of Oklahoma. Following the broad language presented in
Kagama, the Supreme Court followed up with United States v.
Sandoval, which he d C g e
c e ed ab
eg a e
Indigenous peoples in the United States. 80 I h , a e Wa e
Echo-Ha , e e
e he g e
e ac ed d
g he e d
from 1886 to 1934 . . . it invoked the guardianship principle like an
aba hed c
a
e . 81
Id.
Id.
76 CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN
NATIONS 46 (2005).
77 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
78 Id. at 20.
79 See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
80 United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
81 WALTER ECHO-HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR: THE 10 WORST
INDIAN LAW CASES EVER DECIDED 207 (2010).
74
75

69

F a , he S e e C
1884 dec
Elk v. Wilkins
stated that Indigenous people were not citizens of the United States
but of their own, individual nations, and thus could not claim
citizenship regardless of whether they had been born outside of
Indigenous territory.82 There were no voting rights for Indigenous
peoples in the United States and, without citizenship, no
constitutional ones, either. 83 This was, however, soon to change.
8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2) and the Rise of Red Power
Section 1401(b) of Title 8 of the United States Code states
ha The f
g shall be nationals and citizens of the United
States at birth: (b) a person born in the United States to a member of
a I da , E
,Ae a ,
he ab g a
be . . . . 84 As
citizens of the United States, this means that all Indigenous peoples
born within the borders of the United States hold the same state and
federal rights as all other citizens including free speech, freedom
of assembly, and the entitlement of the full protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment.85 The Fourteenth Amendment,
a c a , a e ha [a]
e
b
a a ed
he
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they e de. 86 Section
1401(b) was added to the United States Code in 1924 via the Indian
Citizenship Act; however, it took until the mid-1970s for the
establishment of Indigenous peoples as citizens of the United States
to be fully confirmed.87
Defendants in Goodluck v. Apache County made the claim
that following Elk v. Wilkins in 1884, Indigenous peoples were not
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and thus not citizens
entitled to voting rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.88 The lower court in that case held that when any
party is subject to the plenary power of another, like Indigenous
reservations are to Congressional authority, that party is subject to
he c
eea d
ed a e
dc
f he a
h e a

Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1924); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I-XIV.
84 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1924).
85 See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
86 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
87 Goodluck v. Apache County, 417 F. Supp. 13, 14 (D. Ariz. 1975).
88 Id. at 15.
82
83
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power.89 The S e e C
aff ed he d
c c
dec
in Apache County v. United States the following year.90
The enshrinement of Indigenous peoples as United States
citizens via the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act ensured Indigenous
peoples were now in possession of state and federal constitutional
rights of free speech and assembly. 91 However, civil rights
protections were grossly underenforced. After the allotment era
ended, the highly encouraged relocation of Indigenous peoples off
reservations and into cities allowed for the termination of
Indigenous reservations. Through this, the assimilation/termination
era spawned.92 Thirteen separate termination acts were passed
h gh
he 1950 a d 1960 , e
a g
e ha a h d ed
tribes, including many small, impoverished bands and rancherias in
California and Oregon . . . [affecting] at least 1.3 million acres and
11, 000 people . . . cutting off federal services for 3 percent of all
fede a
ec g ed I d a . 93
Allotment/termination policies had an impact on
Indigenous peoples beyond the violation of their rights as citizens of
the United States. Enduring such brutal attacks on their civil rights
inspired Indigenous peoples to push back. In 1944, the inaugural
National Congress of American Indians (he eaf e NCAI ) e
Denver, Colorado and demanded tribal sovereignty. 94
Simultaneously, Indigenous activists also pushed for tribal
sovereignty, as well as combating Indigenous poverty; retaining
Indigenous territory; and preventing Army Corps projects,
particularly dams, from damaging lands and rivers that were critical
to Indigenous communities.95 In 1963, Alcatraz Prison was shut
down, and after a few false starts, in 1969, a group of Indigenous
protestors landed on the island and claimed it for Indigenous
peoples. They called themselves the Indians of All Tribes, and they
occupied the island for nineteen months.96 A year before, in 1968, a
group of young Chippewa men, including Dennis Banks and Clyde
Bellecourt, founded the American Indian Movement (hereafter
AIM )
a d I d ge
e e
h had bee e ca ed,
Id. at 16.
429 U.S. 876, 876 (1976).
91 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
92 WILKINSON, supra note 76, 64-65.
93 Id. at 81.
94 Id. at 103.
95 Id. at 113-28.
96 Id. at 133-34.
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90
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forcefully or otherwise, from reservations to the slums of
Minneapolis.97 AIM quickly developed into a national movement. It
h ed a c
e -ce eb a
a M
R h
e98; led the Trail
of Broken Treaties to Washington, D.C.; occupied the Bureau of
Indian Affairs building; protested the infamous Guardians Of the
Og a a Na
( GOON )
ad f Og a a S
ba cha a
Dick Wilson;99 and, perhaps most famously, occupied Wounded
Knee for 71 days. By the end of the occupation, two Sioux men had
been shot to death, there had been more than a dozen firefights
between occupiers and federal agents, and more than 1,200 people
had been arrested.100
Similarly, Indigenous women (who had been excluded from
AIM d e
e
h had bec e
acc
a ed
d
a
white society . . . [that it] translated into sexist, repressive behavior
ad
e )f
ded W e f A Red Na
(he eaf e
WARN )
1974. 101 Some of those founders, including Phyllis
Young and Madonna Thunderhawk, were present for the entirety of
the 2016-2017 protests at Standing Rock. 102 Indigenous peoples
were applying their constitutional right to free speech and
assembly and the government was taking notice. Hundreds of
AIM and WARN members were charged with felonies, in an echo
of what would occur at the #NoDAPL protests more than forty years
later.103
At the same time, the Keweenaw Bay Band of Chippewa
were protesting too, using an elegant combination of illegal fishing
and filing court cases to enforce treaty rights.104 The Yakama Nation
in Oregon pushed back against state regulations preventing them,
and other Indigenous peoples including the Umatilla, Warm
Springs, and Nez Pearce from fishing in waters protected by
Id. at 137.
Id. at 139.
99 Id. at 144 (de c b g he
ad a a ba ec
f ce . . .
ee a a d
order. This translated into close and tough surveillance and, apparently,
beatings
fW
ca
e , e ec a AIM
e
).
100 Alysa Landry, Native History: AIM Occupation of Wounded Knee Begins,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Feb. 27, 2017),
https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/native-history-aimoccupation-of-wounded-knee-begins-8Ub_qxe5Tk-RPjNdSvvYDQ/
[https://perma.cc/473J-7SWK].
101 GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 116-17.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 148; see also WATER PROTECTOR LEGAL COLLECTIVE,
waterprotectorlegal.org.
104 WILKINSON, supra note 76, at 156-57.
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treaties the state of Oregon had ignored. 105 In 1969, they won.106
From the 1960s onward, Indigenous activists utilized mass
organization and the First Amendment to push for religious,
reproductive, social, cultural, and environmental equality, with
Indigenous activists particularly women [ a
g]
mainstream visibility.107 The use of protest and free speech by
Indigenous peoples was vastly increasing, and the government
both state and federal was taking notice.
The First Amendment as Applied to the Indigenous Peoples of
the United States
The majority of precedent regarding the application of the
First Amendment to Indigenous peoples in the United States relates
to the Establishment Clause the clause which solemnifies freedom
of religion in the United States. Notably, in the Encyclopedia of
American Indian Civil Rights, he
gf
F
A e d e
ed ec
Re g
F eed . 108 Primarily First Amendment
litigation in Indigenous contexts has been focused on issues such as
the possession and use of peyote,109 the use of eagle feathers in
religious ceremonies; and other elements of traditional religious
practices. The Indian Civil Rights Act, which partly imposes the Bill
of Rights on Indigenous tribal reservations, 110 does not contain an
Establishment Clause. As explained by Vine Deloria Jr.:
The Free Exercise clause . . . since it does not
expressly mention Indian tribes, cannot be used as a
protective constitutional cloak . . . . Congress did
specifically protect individual religious freedoms in
Id. at 165.
Id.
107 GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 118-19.
108JAMES S. OLSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS 130
(James S. Olson et al. eds.1997).
109 See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); People v. Woody,
61 Cal. 2d 716 (1964); see also Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal
Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959).
110 25 U.S.C. § 1301-1303. The Indian Civil Rights Act only applies some civil
rights to tribal jurisdictions; some, including the Fifteenth Amendment, are
absent. Similarly, ICRA places Indigenous jurisdictions under the control of
fede a c
c
gh
a e ,a d e
fede a dge
e e
dec
ade b
ba ff c a
he ad
a
f ba a
he c
rights are involved. See STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND
TRIBES 241(4th ed. 2012).
105
106
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the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act, which prevents
tribal governments from making or enforcing any
laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion . . . . The
1968 act does not, however, contain an
Establishment Clause, as it is regarded as less
important for Indians. 111
There is little if any legal or historic precedent regarding the exercise
of free speech and of free assembly by Indigenous peoples off of
Indigenous land. The primary cases involving Indigenous rights to
free speech, Dodge v. Nakai112, Big Eagle v. Andera113, and Janis v.
Wilson114, among others, mainly explore the conflict between
Indigenous tribal law and the interpretation of the Indian Civil
Rights Act by either federal or the Supreme Court. The cases do not,
and to this point have not, examined the First Amendment rights
violations in response to Indigenous-led protests.115 As will be
e
ed, h e e , a e eg a e
a ed I d ge
e e
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of
association through the construction of critical infrastructure/antiprotest laws. Though these laws were not written to directly target
Indigenous peoples, these laws may unconstitutionally target
Indigenous peoples through their application, preventing them from
fully enjoying their civil rights under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.116
IV.

III. CURRENT TRENDS

Indigenizing Environmental Justice
In January of 2016, the Michigan Civil Rights Commission
bega h d g a e e f hea g
de e
e fa c
gh

VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN
JUSTICE 233 (1983).
112 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969).
113 508 F.2d 1293 (D. S.D. 1976).
114 385 F. Supp. 1143 (D. S.D. 1974).
115 See E
D ., De
f H a Re . f O . . S h, 494 U.S. 872 (1990);
see also L g . N h e I d a Ce e e P ec e A
, 485 U.S. 439
(1988).
116 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); but see Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81 (1943).
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had been abridged by the contamination of the Flint water
d
b
e . 117 These hearings followed in a long line of
similar studies and analyses based around the concept of
environmental racism.
Environmental racism is defined by the Michigan Civil
R gh C
a [ ha ] cc
he
e e f c
repeatedly suffer disproportionate risks and harms from policies and
decisions that equally benefit all. This injustice is even greater when
the benefits of those policies and decisions harm people of color
h ed
a e be ef g [ h e ]. 118 This definition
based off the definition offered by Professor Robert D. Bullard, who
ha bee de c bed a he fa he f e
e a
ce 119 is
incomplete when describing incidents of environmental racism
against Indigenous peoples. Not only does this definition of
environmental racism eliminate the incidents of poor white
communities being affected by pollution, pipeline placements, and
oil spills 120, but the very definitions of environment, justice, and
ac
he e
e
e a ac
a d e
e a
ce
a f
he e a
ed
a a I d ge
e .
E ha
g he a
ha a
e
d
b
e
f
environmental justice fails Indigenous peoples, EJ scholar David
Schlosberg notes . . . that too often Indigenous conceptions of
justice and Indigenous ways of understanding land and human
relations with it a e b c ed
ec g ed a a . 121 As
stated by Gilio-Whitaker:
Applying the lens of settler colonialism to the topic
of environmental justice sheds a different light on the
processes of history, providing irrefutable linkages
between all eras and aspects of settler and Indigenous
contact, environmental injustice, and genocide; they
are inseparable. As a facet of settler colonialism,
environmental injustice is linked with a larger
ongoing process of Indigenous erasure that is built

Systemic Racism Through the Lens of Flint, MICH. C.R. COMM N, *iii,
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdcr/VFlintCrisisRep-F-Edited3-1317_554317_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GVM-RUCF].
118 Id. at 93.
119 Id. at 93, fn. 240.
120 See infra Part III.B.3.
121 GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 23.
117
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into the structure of the State . . . These actions are
not new revelations of previously unknown US
histories; they are familiar genocidal patterns but
viewed now through a lens focused on environmental
factors. They are acts of ecological disruption that
constitute the origin of injustices towards Native
peoples in what might be called an Indigenous
e e
e
e a h
f he U ed
States.122
Under this application, environmental injustice and environmental
inequity are, in themselves, violations of the civil and human rights
of Indigenous peoples, under both U.S. law and UNDRIP.123 The
relocation of Indigenous peoples from their ancestral homelands is
enough to qualify under this model, even without taking into
consideration every other atrocity committed against Indigenous
peoples in the United States. Similarly, acts of environmental racism
or injustice against Indigenous peoples in the United States are not
a new violation of their civil and human rights, but an inherited one.
Under Gilio-Whitake
de , he ge c de f I d ge
e e
of the Americas the destruction and deprivation of Indigenous
agricultural resources, deliberate infection of Indigenous
communities with European diseases, enslavement, forced
relocation and displacement, and the deliberate erasure of
Indigenous religions, histories, and cultures is itself
environmental injustice.124 [I]f e e c
a
e
e a
injustice and settler colonialism is a genocidal structure, then
environmental justice as an analytical framework must be capable
of acknowledging the extent to which historical environmental
disruption structures Native lives today and should factor into the
f
a
f EJ a a d
c e . 125 Indigenous lives, civil rights,
and human rights under UNDRIP are intimately linked to
environmental justice, and Indigenous peoples have and will
continue to exercise their First Amendment right to free speech in
order to protest the violation of those rights.
As explored below, the systemic violations of Indigenous
Id. at 39.
G.A. 61/295, 2007 Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Oct. 2,
2007), Art. 32 §§ 2-3.
124 See GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 52.
125 Id.
122
123

76

civil rights via state legislatures across the country follows a similar
path of environmental and civil injustice through a legal framework.
Mni Wiconi and Oceti Sakowin: The Timeline of #NoDAPL
The impact of the protests at Standing Rock on the First
Amendment rights of Indigenous peoples and on protest law across
the United States cannot be overstated. In December 2015, the U.S.
A
C
f E g ee (he eaf e A
C
C
)
published a draft that outlined its plan to approve the expansion of
he Da a Acce P e e (he eaf e DAPL )
e de ea h
the Missouri River at the Lake Oahe Reservoir. 126 The reservoir,
which is Corps-controlled, sits several miles upstream of where both
the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation and Cheyenne River Sioux
Reservation get their water. 127 Several months previously, the
Corps, in a previous plan, had projected the construction of the
pipeline a few miles north of Bismarck, North Dakota; the Corps
abruptly changed its proposal after an environmental assessment
indicated that it would be too dangerous for the municipal water
supply to have a pipeline installed so close to Bismarck. 128 This
sudden change was widely criticized as an act of environmental
racism, as Bismarck, per the U.S. Census, is approximately 91%
white.129

Rebecca Hersher, Key Moments in the Dakota Access Pipeline Fight, NAT L
PUB. RADIO (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/02/22/514988040/key-moments-in-the-dakota-access-pipeline-fight
[https://perma.cc/FW2H-H9QQ].
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Ramon Jacobs-Shaw, What Standing Rock Teaches Us About Environmental
Racism and Justice, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Apr. 17. 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170417.059659/full/
[https://perma.cc/5LWF-ADC2]; see also Systemic Racism Through the Lens of
Flint, MICH. C.R. COMM N, *93,
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdcr/VFlintCrisisRep-F-Edited3-1317_554317_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GVM-RUCF]; see also U.S. Census,
Bismarck, North Dakota, U.S. CENSUS,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/bismarckcitynorthdakota/RHI1252
18 (5-year estimate post-the 2017 American Community Survey)
[https://perma.cc/EK4J-GRBV].
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Carl Sack, CC-BY130
The C
a chae g
de e
ed d
g he C
survey of the new proposed installation site at Lake Oahe that there
e e a ea f e ec ded c
a
e
h ch gh be affec ed
b he c
c
a d
a a
f he
e e, b ha
h
c
e e
be b ec
effec . 131 Similarly, the
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation recommended the Corps
to cooperate with tribal leaders.132 On July 25, 2016, the Corps
approved the pipeline route, with a district director claiming that
he had e a a ed he a c a ed e
e a , ec
c,
cultural, and social effects, and any cumulative effects of [the
crossing] . . . [it is] not
he b c e e . 133 They had
not met with tribal leaders.
The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe sued the Army Corps,
claiming that the Corps had not consulted tribe members prior to the
approval of the pipeline as they were required to, and the Dakota
Access Pipeline would cause extreme risk to the historic sites within
the realm of potential impact. 134 In April 2016, a few women from
the Standing Rock Sioux set up camp and named it the Camp of
Carl Sack, A #NoDAPL Map, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2016, 11:48AM,
updated Dec. 2, 2016) https://www.huffpost.com/entry/a-nodaplmap_b_581a0623e4b014443087af35 [https://perma.cc/UR2Z-V5WG].
131 Hersher, supra note 126.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
130

78

Sacred S e ( Sac ed S e Ca
), the first in what became a
sprawling, long-term, multi-camp protest.135 Sacred Stone Camp
was intended to monitor the construction of the pipeline as well as
indicating tribal dissent to the project. 136 As time passed, more and
more protestors later known as Water Protectors amassed near
the Lake Oahe crossing. Hundreds of tribes by the end, more than
three hundred traveled to the Standing Rock camp in North
Dakota to stand against the construction of the DAPL. Hashtags
dominated Twitter, including #MniWiconi, #NoDAPL, and
#StandwithStandingRock as the world began to take notice.137
Eventually, there were three camps: Sacred Stone Camp, Oceti
Sa
( ea g Se e C
c F e , he
e a e f he
Sioux people) Camp, and the 1851 Treaty Camp, named for the
Treaty of Fort Laramie.138
Pipeline construction, which was scheduled to start on
August 10, could not begin due to protesters demonstrating at the
Lake Oahe River crossing.139 Dakota Access LLC, a subsidiary of
he
e e E e g T a fe Pa e
(he eaf e
ETP ),
countersued the Standing Rock Sioux in retaliation.140 ETP also
hired private security officers, which eventually led to violent
clashes between the Standing Rock protestors.141 Notably, on
September 3:
[A]s people attempted to block the digging up of a
sacred site, ETP brought in a private security firm
armed with approximately eight attack dogs and

GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 3.
Id.
137 Id.
138 Section 3: The Treaties of Fort Laramie, 1851 & 1868, N.D. STUDIES,
https://www.ndstudies.gov/gr8/content/unit-iii-waves-development-18611920/lesson-4-alliances-and-conflicts/topic-2-sitting-bulls-people/section-3treaties-fort-laramie-1851-1868 [https://perma.cc/5C65-FGDJ] (describing the
treaties which established the boundaries of Indigenous territory in the Great
Plains at that time, and which the Standing Rock Sioux had never ceded to the
United States).
139 Hersher, supra note 126.
140 Id.
141 Eyder Peralta, Dakota Access Pipeline Protests in North Dakota Turn
Violent, NAT L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 4, 2016, 4:14 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/09/04/492625850/dakota-accesspipeline-protests-in-north-dakota-turn-violent [https://perma.cc/UF53-9HKZ]
( a g ha [ ] de f
he ce e h ed ec
ff ce h ea e g he
e
h d g ).
135
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mace. The security personnel sprayed people directly
in the face and eyes and pushed the dogs to bite
people. One dog was unleashed and ran into the
crowd in attack mode. At least five people and a
horse were bitten, and around thirty people were
injured via the chemical spray. Images and video of
the dog attack went viral on social media, thanks to
the handful of journalists at the site, particularly Amy
Goodman of the popular program Democracy Now!,
for whom an arrest warrant was later issued by the
M
C
She ff De a e . 142
Though District Judge James Boasberg ordered a temporary
halt on the pipeline on September 6, 2016, the Governor of North
Da a de ed he N h Da a Na
a G ad
a
cal law
e f ce e
ha had bee
g de
a
. 143 The
Sa d g R c S
e
he c
c
f he
pipeline was denied on September 9. 144 In response, the Department
f J ce (he eaf e DOJ ), he De a e f he A
(hereafter
DOA ) a d he De a e f he I e
(he eaf e he I e
)
stated that the construction project should not proceed until the
Corps had further consulted with the Standing Rock and Cheyenne
River Sioux tribes.145 ETP ignored this request, and continued
construction, resulting in twenty-seven Water Protectors were
arrested by law enforcement for demonstrating at the river
crossing.146 That same law enforcement a mix of private security
companies, the North Dakota National Guard, and the Morton
C
She ff De a e
were filmed using tear gas and water
cannons against Water Protectors.147 Water Protectors then claimed
eminent domain on the next segment of land meant for the pipeline,
citing the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie and stating that the Sioux had
never ceded the land the pipeline was now meant to be built on. 148
GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 4.
Hersher, supra note 126.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 See Section 3: Treaties of Fort Laramie, 1851 & 1868, N.D. STUDIES,
https://www.ndstudies.gov/gr8/content/unit-iii-waves-development-18611920/lesson-4-alliances-and-conflicts/topic-2-sitting-bulls-people/section-3treaties-fort-laramie-1851-1868 [https://perma.cc/5C65-FGDJ].
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In retaliation, the military police hired by the ETP conducted a
raid.149 Weapons used in the raid included Long Range Acoustic
Devices (LRADs), tasers, concussion grenades, batons, snipers, and
pepper spray, among other weapons.150 The October 27 assault on
the camps resulted in the arrest of 141 Water Protectors and many
injuries.151
On December 4, the Army Corps announced that it would
not grant the lake crossing permit, and tha he be
a
c
ee
[the pipeline] responsibly and expeditiously is to explore alternate
e f he
e ec
g. 152 However, after the election of
Donald Trump and his inauguration on January 20, 2017, the
#NoDAPL protests and the camps were doomed. On January 24,
2017, President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum
authorizing both the Dakota Access Pipeline and the Keystone XL
Pipeline.153 On February 23, 2017, the remaining protestors at the
Oceti Sakowin camp were arrested and removed.154
While the protest itself was forcibly ended and the camps
dismantled, the legal battle over the construction and use of the
DAPL is continuing. Even as the camps were being taken down, the
Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux have been in a
contentious legal battle with the Army Corps. The most recent filing
is a supplemental complaint made by the Standing Rock and
Cheyenne River Sioux tribes. 155 The c
a de a d ha he
C
dec
aff
g a dec
[ f
e e
placement] without a comprehensive environmental review and
adequate consultation with the Tribe was arbitrary, capricious, and
in violation of the [Administrative Procedure Act], [the National
E
e a P c Ac ], a d he T be
ea
gh . 156 As of
this time, there has been no response to the complaint from the ETP
Hersher, supra note 126.
GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 7.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 9.
153 Id.
154 Julia Carrie Wong, Police remove last Standing Rock protestors in militarystyle takeover, THE GUARDIAN, (Feb. 23, 2017 4:52 PM)
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/23/dakota-access-pipelinecamp-cleared-standing-rock [https://perma.cc/6YCM-PL48].
155 The Standing Rock Sioux Tribes Litigation on the Dakota Access Pipeline,
EARTHJUSTICE (updated Nov. 1, 2018), https://earthjustice.org/features/faqstanding-rock-litigation [https://perma.cc/N3VC-T7LH].
156 First Supplemental Complaint, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe & Cheyenne
R e S
T be . U.S. A
C
f E g , Case No. 1:16-cv-1534-JEB
(D.D.C., Nov. 1, 2018), *2.
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or the Dakota Access Pipeline.
Soon after the protests at Standing Rock were shut down,
bills began to churn out of state legislatures. Oklahoma was most
likely the first state to sign such a law into effect. As stated above,
there have been more than 100 laws that have been proposed around
the United States regarding the restriction or criminalization of
protests.157 Many of these laws, particularly in the Dakotas, have
been directly inspired by or constructed from what lawmakers and
oil companies observed occurring at the #NoDAPL protests. The
International Human Rights Advocacy Workshop at the University
of Arizona compiled a report citing the spike in anti-protest law in
response to the Standing Rock protests.158 The report claims that
[ ]he e a
ge
ad c
a
gd e a dc d
g
the use of excessive force towards human rights defenders including
I d ge
e e . 159 As many bills and laws continue to be
proposed, discussed, and passed across the United States many
more than can be handled in a single paper only a handful of them
will be examined here.
It must be noted that after the writing, passing, and
implementation of a critical infrastructure law in Oklahoma, the
A e ca Leg a e E cha ge C
c (he eaf e
ALEC )
drafted a sample bill based upon the Oklahoma law, and released it
on their website. ALEC is an organization of state legislators and
representatives from the private sector including oil companies
which frequently collaborate on the construction of model bills for
state governments.160 A
ab e e a
e f ALEC a
eb
the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,

US P e La T ac e , I
C . f N -For-Profit Law, Enacted Bills,
http://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker/?location=&status=enacted&issue=&da
te=&type=legislative [https://perma.cc/YN7Q-ZLE5].
158 Indigenous Resistance to the Dakota Access Pipeline: Criminalization of
Dissent and Suppression of Protest, Rep. to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Victoria Tauli-C
,I
H . R . Ad cac
Workshop at the U. of A. Rogers College of L. on behalf of the Water Protector
Legal Collective,
https://law.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/Indigenous%20Resistance%20to%20th
e%20Dakota%20Access%20Pipeline%20Criminalization%20of%20Dissent%20
and%20Suppression%20of%20Protest.pdf [https://perma.cc/NP69-YLDZ].
159 Id.
160 American Legislative Exchange Council, Critical Infrastructure Protection
Act, ALEC, https://www.alec.org/model-policy/critical-infrastructureprotection-act/ [https://perma.cc/2J36-P7UN] (states that the sample bill
[d a ]
a
f
a e ac ed 2017 b he S a e f O ah a ).
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popularly known in Arizona as SB 1070.161 A number of states have
used the sample critical infrastructure bill drafted by ALEC to draft
their own critical infrastructure laws; much of the same language is
to be found in the federal Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines
and Enhancing Safety Act of 2019 (hereafte he P e e Ac ),
the draft of which was released online on March 5, 2019.162
Current Laws
1. Oklahoma
The impact of the #NoDAPL protests have been felt across
the country. Not only were the camps at Standing Rock
unprecedented at their height they housed thousands of people163,
with a population representing more than 300 Indigenous tribes and
communities in the United States but legislators around the U.S.
watched and listened. Before the camps were even dismantled, in
January 2017, lawmakers in Oklahoma introduced House Bill 1123
(he eaf e HB 1123 ), c d f g a e
b ec
, Sec
1792 f
Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes, which stated:
A. Any person who shall willingly trespass or enter
property containing a critical infrastructure facility
without permission by the owner . . . or lawful
occupant . . . shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than
One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), or by
imprisonment in the county jail for a term of six (6)
months, or by both such fine and imprisonment. If it
Talk of the Nation, How Corporate Interests Got SB 1070 Passed, NAT L
PUB. RADIO (Nov. 9, 2010, 1:00 PM)
https://www.npr.org/2010/11/09/131191523/how-corporate-interests-got-sb1070-passed [https://perma.cc/UGP7-AMGM].
162 Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2019:
Section-by-Section Analysis and Legislative Text, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., (Mar. 5, 2019)
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/news/protecting-our-infrastructure-pipelines-andenhancing-safety-act-2019-section-section-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/K322PJ89].
163 Alleen Brown, Trump Administration Asks Congress to Make Disrupting
Pipeline Construction a Crime Punishable by 20 Years in Prison, THE
INTERCEPT (June 5, 2019, 11:10AM),
https://theintercept.com/2019/06/05/pipeline-protests-proposed-legislationphmsa-alec/ [https://perma.cc/3ARU-PM3G].
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is determined the intent of the trespasser is to
willfully damage, destroy . . . or impede or inhibit
operations of the facility . . . [they shall be fined] not
less than Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) or by
an imprisonment in the custody of the Department of
Corrections for a term of one (1) year, or by both . . .
D. A
ed
h
ec
, c ca
fa c e
facility means:
1. One of the following . . .
p. a crude oil or refined products storage and
distribution facility including, but not limited to . . .
pipeline interconnections . . . [or] below or
aboveground pipeline . . .164
HB 1123 also fines any organization it deems or have been found to
be c
a
e
e he amount of said fine authorized by the
a
ae
f h ec
that is, anywhere up to a
million dollars.165
The sponsor of the bill, Rep. Scott Biggs of the Oklahoma
State House, stated that he developed the bill as a response to
watching the #NoDAPL protests unfold in North Dakota. 166 On the
H ef
, he a ed, [a]c
he c
, e ha e ee
ea d
time again these protests have turned violent, these protests have
disrupted the infrastructure in other states . . . . This is a preventative
ea e . . .
a e e ha d e
ha e he e. 167
HB 1123
e f a b
ca
g
ec c ca
f a c e. A
ed ab e, he a g age ed HB 1123 ha
been closely modeled by ALEC.

H.B. 1123, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017).
Id.
166 Staff, In wake of environmental protests, legislation aims to protect critical
infrastructure 2017, GEO. UNIV.: THE FREE SPEECH PROJECT (Aug. 22, 2017,
12:00AM) https://freespeechproject.georgetown.edu/tracker-entries/legislationaims-to-protect-critical-infrastructure-in-wake-of-environmental-protests/
[https://perma.cc/R7JB-WWEH].
167 Id.
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2. North and South Dakota168
It is perhaps unsurprising that North Dakota, the epicenter of
the Standing Rock protests, has had not one, but five separate laws
criminalizing protest within its borders the most of any state in the
nation.169 One of them, House Bill 1203 (Eliminating driver liability
for hitting protestors) was defeated in the House, but the other four
have been enacted into law. 170 Two bills stand out: Senate Bill 2044
(Heightened penalties for protests near critical infrastructures)
(he eaf e SB 2044 ), h ch a g ed
a b G e
Doug Burgum on April 10, 2019) and House Bill 1293 (Expanded
scope of criminal trespass) (he eaf e HB 1293 ). HB 1293 a
signed into law on February 23, 2017 the same day that the camps
at Lake Oahe Reservoir were violently dismantled by the Morris
C
She ff De a e . 171 Analysis of North Dakota statutes
will be restricted to SB 2044, as it is a critical infrastructure law, but
a
e ha HB 1293 a
ff ce
e a
citation with a $250 fine for trespassing, as opposed to filing
c
a cha ge . 172 Further analysis of the implications of HB
1293 must be conducted elsewhere.
SB 2044 (codified at 12.1-21-06 in the North Dakota
Century Code) amends the code to make it a Class C felony173
punishable by a maximum fine of $10,000, an imprisonment of up
to five years, or both174 if any person intentionally causes:
1. [A] substantial interruption or impairment of a
critical infrastructure facility or a public service by:
North and South Dakota have multiple Indigenous communities which,
similar to the Navajo Nation in the Four Corners, are not contained by state
borders. The Standing Rock Sioux Reservation crosses the border between
North and South Dakota. It is for this reason they have been grouped together in
this segment of the paper.
169 U.S. Protest Law Tracker, Enacted Laws,
http://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker/?location=&status=enacted&issue=&da
te=&type=legislative [https://perma.cc/VCD6-59LU].
170 H.B. 1203, 65th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2017).
171 S.B. 2044, 66th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2019); H.B. 1293, 2019
Leg., 66th Sess. (N.D. 2019).
172 Office of the Governor, Burgum signs bills into law to protect landowner
rights, deter criminal activity, N.D. S a e G
(Feb. 23, 2017, 5:00 PM),
https://www.governor.nd.gov/news/burgum-signs-bills-law-protect-landownerrights-deter-criminal-activity [https://perma.cc/B8HR-KHCW].
173 H.B. 1293, 2019 Leg., 66th Sess. (N.D. 2019).
174 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01 (2019).
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a. Tampering with or damaging the tangible property
of another; . . .
c. Damaging, destroying, vandalizing, defacing, or
tampering with equipment in a critical infrastructure
facility;
d. Damaging, destroying, vandalizing, defacing,
impeding, inhibiting, or tampering with the
operations of a critical structure facility; or
e. Interfering, inhibiting, impeding, or preventing the
construction or repair of a critical infrastructure
facility.175
On its face, SB 2044 is a direct reaction to the Standing Rock
protests, where Indigenous protestors would chain themselves to
heavy equipment, stand in the way of machinery, or raise flags on
unceded territory.176 However, SB 2044 contains another subsection
h ch e
c
a e ga a
h ch [ha e] ed g
or been convicted of a violation under section 12.1-06-04 for
conspiring with an individual who has pled guilty or been convicted
under subsection 1 must be assessed a fine equivalent to the penalty
...
e ceed e h d ed h a d d a . 177 The concepts of
interfering with, inhibiting, and impeding the construction or repair
of a critical infrastructure facility the definition of which includes
everything from a railway switchyard to below- or above-ground
pipelines are not defined in-statute.178
South Dakota has drafted and passed similar laws. Most
notably, the South Dakota State Senate drafted Senate Bill 189
(he eaf e SB 189 ), h ch a g ed b he G e
fS h
Dakota, Kristi Noem, on March 27, 2019. SB 189, described as a
e e a e aga
b
g. Wh e SB 189
a c cal
infrastructure law, it shares multiple qualities with the critical
infrastructure laws investigated in this paper, and was derived from
similar motives, as will be explored later. SB 189 declares liability
to the state if:
[J]ointly and severally with any other person . . . the
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-06(1) (2019).
GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, 3-10.
177 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-06(4) (2019).
178 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-06(1)(e) (2019). See also N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-21.06(6)(a)-(s) (2019).
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person:
1) Participates in any riot and directs, advises,
encourages, or solicits any other person participating
in the riot to acts of force or violence;
2) Does not personally participate in any riot but
directs, advises, encourages, or solicits other
persons participating in the riot to acts of force or
violence, or;
3) Upon the direction, advice, encouragement, or
solicitation of any other person, uses force or
violence, or makes any threat to use force or
violence, if accompanied by immediate power of
execution, by three or more persons, acting together
and without authority of law. . . . 179
A
e
a
d d a,
e
e, a c a
,
partnership, cooperative, limited liability company, corporation,
[non- f ], he e
, a g
ac g a a
. 180 A riot,
acc d g S h Da a a , a fe
h ch
e [a]
use of force or violence or any threat to use force or violence, if
accompanied by immediate power of execution, by three or more
e
, ac g ge he a d
h
a h
f a . . . . 181 SB
189 also subjects any person to the jurisdiction of South Dakota
c
f
b
g ha e
a riot in this state, regardless
of whether the person engages in riot boosting personally, or
h gh a
e
ee, age ,
b d a . 182 This means,
essentially, that any person including non-profits who
e c age
e ef
d ha e bee
g
de h statute,
whether in person, over the phone, over a text message, via a retweet
T
e,
a
he f
f e c age e
c a
,
may be found liable in a South Dakota court. This is regardless of
whether that person or organization was present in South Dakota at
the time of the riot.

S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb. 2019, § 2(1)-(3) (S.D. 2018) (emphasis
added).
180 Id. at § 1.
181 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-10-1 (2019).
182 S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb. 2019 at § 3.
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3. Louisiana
The Bayou Bridge Pipeline actually connects with the
Dakota Access Pipeline in a somewhat roundabout way, linking
thousands of miles across the nation at the southern border of
Colorado.183 The pipeline is, according to the American Civil
L be e U
(he eaf e ACLU ), 162.5
e
g, f
La e
Charles to St. James, through 700 bodies of water, including the
Atchafalaya Basin and Bayou LaFourche, the source of drinking
water for the United Houma Nation and other surrounding
c
e . 184

Map of Bayou Bridge Pipeline, Dan Swenson, The Advocate185
Approximately three months after the end of the Standing
Rock protests, the Louisiana state legislature passed House Bill 727
(he eaf e HB 727 ). HB 727 a e ded L
a a a R.S. 14:61,
and enacted R.S. 14:61(B)(3) as well as 14:61.1. HB 727 was
drafted by the Louisiana Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association
(he eaf e LMOGA ). The e e
f he a , h ch e
effect on August 1, 2018, states the following:

Connor Gibson, State Bills to Criminalize Peaceful Protest of Oil & Gas
Cri ical Infras r c re, POLLUTERWATCH (Feb. 18, 2019)
https://polluterwatch.org/State-Bills-Criminalize-Peaceful-Protest-Oil-GasCritical-Infrastructure-pipelines [https://perma.cc/Z2LT-9ESX] (citing map).
184 Complaint, White Hat et al. v. Landry et al., Case No. 3:19-cv-00322, *4
(M.D. La., May 22, 2019).
185 David J. Mitchell, Bayou Bridge Pipeline ready for service April 1,
companies say, THE ADVOCATE (Mar. 27, 2019, 2:40 PM),
https://www.theadvocate.com/acadiana/news/article_2a386fac-50c8-11e9-8d660b06203b8ae1.html [https://perma.cc/8VQN-EZVL].
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61. Unauthorized entry of a critical infrastructure.
B. For the purposes of this Section, the following
words shall have the following meanings:
(1) C ca
fa c e
ea
a
a d a
structures, equipment, or other immovable or
movable property located upon . . . pipelines . . . or
any site where the construction or improvement of
any facility or structure referenced in this Section is
occurring . . . .
(3) Pipeline means flow, transmission, distribution,
or gathering lines, regardless of size or length, which
transmit and transport oil, gas, petrochemicals,
minerals or water in a solid, liquid, or gaseous state.
...
D. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to apply
to or prevent the following:
(1) Lawful assembly and peaceful and orderly
petition, picketing, or demonstration for the redress
of grievances or to express ideas or views regarding
legitimate matters of public interest, including but
not limited to any labor dispute . . . .
(2) La f l commercial or recrea ional ac i i ies 186
The phrasing of the 14:61 and 14:61.1 amendments and additions
drafted in HB 727 do not demarcate between visible, above-ground
pipeline and invisible, below-ground pipeline.187
4. Texas
S

a
b
ed ab e, H e B 3557 (he eaf e HB
3557 )
de a e d e
S b e B, T e 4 f he Te a
Government Code to provide a new chapter.
424.001. Def
. I
h
cha e , c ca
f a c e fac
ha he ea g assigned by
Section 423.0045(a)(1-a) and also includes:
(1) any pipeline transporting oil or gas or the
products or constituents of oil or gas; and
186
187

LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14:61(B)-(D) (2018) (emphasis added on new text of law).
Id. at § (B)(1).
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(2) a facility or pipeline described by this section that
is under construction and all equipment and
appurtenances used during that construction . . .
424.052. Offense: Impairing or Interrupting
Operation of Critical Infrastructure Facility.
(a) A person commits an offense if, without the
effective consent of the owner, the person enters or
remains on or in a critical infrastructure facility and
intentionally or knowingly impairs or interrupts the
operation of the facility.
(b) An offense under this section is a state jail felony
424.054. Offense: Intent to Impair or Interrupt
Operation of a Critical Infrastructure Facility.
(a) A person commits an offense if, without the
effective consent of the owner, the person enters or
remains on or in a critical infrastructure facility with
the intent to impair or interrupt the operation of the
fac
424.055. Punishment for Corporations and
Associations. Notwithstanding Section 12.51, Penal
Code, a court shall sentence a corporation or
association adjudged guilty of an offense under this
subchapter to pay a fine not to exceed $500,000. 188
Sections 424.052 and 424.054 are both categorized as state jail
fe
e , h ch Te a a a e
hab e b c f e e
a
state jail for any term of not more than two years or less than 180
da . 189 Add
a , h e c
c ed f a e a fe
e []
addition to confinement . . . may be punished by a fine not to exceed
$10,000. 190 Similar to HB 727 in Louisiana, HB 3557 does not
differentiate between above- or below-ground pipelines. It does not
d ffe e a e be ee
he
a ce
f
e
e
app e a ce
he he a e - or off-grounds of a pipeline
facility. This bill was signed into law on June 14, 2019 and will go
into effect on September 1, 2019. 191
H.B. 3557, 86th Leg. Sess. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019).
TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.35(a) (2019).
190 Id. at (b).
191 H.B. 3557, 86th Leg. Sess. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019).
188
189

90

5. Federal
The development of the state anti-protest laws detailed
above appears to only be the opening act. As of June 3, 2019, the
Trump administration has proposed a new act, the Protecting Our
Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2019. This
act correlates almost exactly to similar laws first proposed in
Oklahoma and then ad ed b a e a
d he a
a ALEC
sample critical infrastructure bill. 192 Under the Pipelines Act,
Section 60123(b) of Title 49 of the U.S. Code already a stalwart
defense against any attack on pipelines in the U.S., with a twenty
year prison sentence for anyone found to be damaging or destroying
those pipes is amended to:
(1) [
e] da ag g
de
g a d [ e ]
da ag g, de
g, a da
g, a e g h,
impeding the operation of, disrupting the operation
of, or inhibiting the operation of
(2) [ e ] c d g a fac
a ead
ea
and a facility under construction and intended to be
operated as such a facility on completion of the
c
c
, bef e
a e
g . 193
This would transform Section 60123(b) to read:
A person knowingly and willfully damaging,
destroying, vandalizing, tampering with, impeding
the operation of, disrupting the operation of, or
inhibiting the operation of an interstate gas pipeline
facility . . . including a facility already in operation
and a facility under construction and intended to be
operated as such a facility on completion of the
construction, or attempting or conspiring to do such

Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2019:
Section-by-Section Analysis and Legislative Text, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., (Mar. 5, 2019)
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/news/protecting-our-infrastructure-pipelines-andenhancing-safety-act-2019-section-section-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/K322PJ89].
193 Id. (emphasis added).
192
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an act, shall be fined . . . imprisoned for not more
than 20 years, or both . . . .194
Federal charges would apply to anyone who attempts to damage,
destroy, tamper with, impede, inhibit, or disrupt the operation of, or
even vandalize an interstate pipeline. These charges carry a sentence
of up to twenty years. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, under the U.S. Department of Transportation,
ca
ha he
a
e ded
e e a f
e
from exercising their [F]irst [A] e d e
gh . 195 Unlike SB
189 and HB 1123, the Pipelines Act does not currently include
provisions that could criminalize agencies or non-profits supporting
protestors and facilitating free speech. However, should the
Pipelines Act be passed, it will provide ammunition to prosecutors
to charge organizations with state and federal crimes in both South
Dakota and Texas.
V.

IV. THE CHILLING OF INDIGENOUS FREE SPEECH BY
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE LAWS

These Critical Infrastructure/Anti-Protest Laws Are
Unconstitutional on Their Face and In Their Application
Establishing whether a law violates the First Amendment
requires examining the law to determine whether it is vague,
overbroad, or both. As per the precedent set post-Dennis, if a law is
so vaguely defined that free speech cannot be exercised without
potential criminalization, then it is unconstitutional. Similarly, if a
law is so broadly defined that protected speech is criminalized
alongside unprotected speech, it violates the First Amendment. Each
of the six laws detailed above are vague, overbroad, or both. They
are unconstitutional both on their face and in their application and
must be severed or entirely repealed to fully protect Indigenous
e e
gh
f ee eech a d a e b .

Id. (emphasis added). See also 49 U.S.C. § 60123(b).
Stephen Cunningham & Catherine Traywick, Pipe Protesters Could Face 20Year Prison Sentence Under Trump Plan, BLOOMBERG (June 4, 2019,
11:02AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-03/pipelineprotesters-could-face-20-year-sentence-under-trump-plan
[https://perma.cc/AAX3-7S7M].
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1. These Critical Infrastructure/Anti-Protest Laws are
Unconstitutionally Vague and Misleading to the Public
Each of the laws provided above have vague or overbroad
clauses which result in the chilling of free speech. These clauses can
be divided into three distinct forms: the impeding or impairing
clause, the advising and encouraging clause, and the above- and
below-ground clause, which is discussed further in Part 2 of this
section. The first of these clauses, the impeding or impairing clause,
presents in various forms in four of the six laws listed above,
including the federal Pipelines Act. The impeding or impairing
clause is unconstitutionally vague, serving only to confuse and
mislead the public, and result in each of the four laws it appears in
being unconstitutional.
As per the Rules of Construction followed by the Rehnquist
Supreme Court, dictionary definitions of terms can be used unless
Congress (state or federal) have provided a specific definition. 196 As
unless otherwise stated none of the laws we are examining here have
provided definitions for the terms they are using, turning to the
dictionary provides some sort of guidance as to what kinds of
behavior these clauses may be describing. The Merriam-Webster
Dc
a def e he e b
ede a
e fe e
h or slow
he
ge
f
e h g.197 S
a , def e
hb a
hb f
d g
eh g
h d chec ; e a
a d
a a
d
h f c
, ab
,
a ;
ea e
a e
e. 198 F a ,
e
def ed a
h de b b ea g ,
b ea he
f
c
f,
b ea
a ac
. 199 These terms, in one form or
another, are present in four of the six laws that have been described
above: HB 1123 in Oklahoma; SB 2044 in North Dakota; HB 3557
in Texas; and the Pipelines Act as proposed by the Trump

See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Rehnq is Co r s
Canons of Statutory Construction, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994) (derived from
a e d
F
a d: La a E
b
).
197 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Impede, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/impede [https://perma.cc/547J-P7Y8].
198 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Impair, merriamwebster.com/dictionary/inhibit; https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/impair [https://perma.cc/HWY4-TGFP].
199 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Interrupt, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/interrupt [https://perma.cc/K54Z-HFQ2].
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administration.200
In its first appearance in HB 1123 (presumably the first of
any of the critical infrastructure laws), the impeding or impairing
clause is added to the establishment of intent of anyone convicted
under the statute. Under HB 1123, codified into law at Title 21,
Sec
1792 f he O ah a S a e C de, [ ]f
de e
ed he
intent of the trespasser [on a critical infrastructure property] is to
willfully damage, destroy . . . or impede or inhibit operations of the
fac
. . . (e ha added) he ha e a e
be f ed
less than $10,000 or given a prison sentence of up to a year. 201 This
marks an increase of the fine by ten times its original amount as the
original trespass fine, and doubling the potential prison time. 202
This language is mirrored almost perfectly by the draft bill
proposed by ALEC, which has been used by multiple states as a
basis for their own laws.203 This is not surprising, as HB 1123 in
O ah a a he ad
ed
a
f ALEC d af c ca
f a c e b . ALEC b , h ch a
a e
e f he
impeding and impairing clause, repeats the language of HB 1123
almost exactly, stating:
Section 2. {Criminal Penalties.}.
A. Any person who shall willfully or knowingly
trespass or enter property containing a critical
infrastructure facility . . . shall, upon conviction, be
guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not
less than {dollar figure}, or by imprisonment . . . or
by both such fine and imprisonment. If it is
H.B. 1123, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017); S.B. 2044 66th Leg.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2019); H.B. 3557, 86th Leg. Sess. Reg. Sess. (Tex.
2019); Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of
2019: Section-by-Section Analysis and Legislative Text, PIPELINE AND
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., (Mar. 5, 2019)
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/news/protecting-our-infrastructure-pipelines-andenhancing-safety-act-2019-section-section-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/K322PJ89].
201 H.B. 1123, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017).
202 Id.
203 Connor Gibson, State Bills to Criminalize Peaceful Protest of Oil & Gas
Cri ical Infras r c re, POLLUTERWATCH (Feb. 18, 2019)
https://polluterwatch.org/State-Bills-Criminalize-Peaceful-Protest-Oil-GasCritical-Infrastructure-pipelines; see also American Legislative Exchange
Council, Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, ALEC,
https://www.alec.org/model-policy/critical-infrastructure-protection-act/
[https://perma.cc/VYJ9-QSLG].
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determined the intent of the trespasser is to
f
impede or inhibit operations of the
facility, the person shall, upon conviction, be guilty
f a fe
204
ALEC b l has been modified and introduced in more than twenty
states since it was introduced by the organization. 205
L e O ah a HB 1123, SB 2044
N h Da a
amended North Dakota Code. The new subsection of 12.1-21-06(1)
now includes subsections (d) and (e), h ch a e ha d. . . .
impeding, inhibiting, or tampering with the operations of a critical
structure facility; or e. Interfering, inhibiting, impeding, or
preventing the construction or repair of a critical infrastructure
fac
ae
a C a s C felony, which carries a $10,000 fine, a
prison sentence of up to five years, or both. 206 Similarly, HB 3557
in Texas introduces a whole set of subsections, each including the
impeding or impairing clause. The language is not matched
exactly the law prohibits impairing or interruption of a critical
infrastructure facility but similar enough that it has clearly been
drawn from similar intent. Notably:
424.052. Offense: Impairing or Interrupting
Operation of Critical Infrastructure Facility.
(a) A person commits an offense if, without the
effective consent of the owner, the person enters or
remains on or in a critical infrastructure facility and
intentionally or knowingly impairs or interrupts the
operation of the facility.
(b) An offense under this section is a state jail felony
424.054. Offense: Intent to Impair or Interrupt
Operation of a Critical Infrastructure Facility.
(a) A person commits an offense if, without the
effective consent of the owner, the person enters or
remains on or in a critical infrastructure facility with
American Legislative Exchange Council, Critical Infrastructure Protection
Act, ALEC, https://www.alec.org/model-policy/critical-infrastructureprotection-act/ [https://perma.cc/F84Y-BLVF].
205 Complaint, White Hat et al. v. Landry et al., Case No. 3:19-cv-00322, *16
(M.D. La., May 22, 2019).
206 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-06(1) (2019).
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the intent to impair or interrupt the operation of the
fac
424.055. Punishment for Corporations and
Associations. Notwithstanding Section 12.51, Penal
Code, a court shall sentence a corporation or
association adjudged guilty of an offense under this
subchapter to pay a fine not to exceed $500,000. 207
Beyond the issues with vagueness in how HB 3557 has been
constructed, HB 3557 adds additional consequences for any kind of
organization found guilty of impairing or interrupting the operation
of a critical infrastructure facility, slapping them with a fine of up to
five hundred thousand dollars. Critically, this subsection could
extend to non-profit and legal groups which advocate and organize
any kind of protest or demonstration against the building or
existence of a pipeline in the state of Texas, if they fall into the
definition of a corporation or association. Organizations such as
EarthJustice and the ACLU will be obvious potential victims of this
subsection, but some of the loudest voices against the installation
and funding of pipelines in Texas have been Indigenous
organizations. HB 3557, which transforms interference with critical
infrastructure from a misdemeanor to a felony, would have
immediate consequences for the Indigenous peoples of southern
Texas, particularly the Carrizo Camecrudo of South Texas. The
Carrizo Camecrudo have been in long-term opposition to not only
the Rio Grande LNG plant but also the possibility of two Kinder
Morgan pipelines from the Permian Basin to Brownsville. 208 The
construction of these entities would effectively cram the Carrizo
Camecrudo between two natural gas pipelines and the proposed
southern border wall. 209 The companies do not have any legal
obligation to consult with tribal leadership prior to installation, as

H.B. 3557, 86th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019).
Frank Hopper, Kill he bill! Sa e he land! Na i e pro ec ors disr p Te as
legislature, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (May 10, 2019),
https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/news/kill-the-bill-save-the-landnative-protectors-disrupt-texas-legislature-qNlvwX7lPkeLgU5y6wJVpw/
[https://perma.cc/ZXB7-EEJS].
209 Id.
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the Carrizo Camecrudo are not federally recognized as a tribe. 210 A
demonstration against the bill in the Texas State House of
Representatives by the Carrizo Camecrudo and the Society of
Native Nations led to a number of people receiving criminal trespass
warnings.211 Should the Carrizo Camecrudo and Society of Native
Nations continue to protest the installation and development of
pipelines in the state of Texas, they could be found as having
impaired or interrupted the function of a critical infrastructure, and
fined up to half a million dollars.
Perhaps most critically, this impeding and impairing
language is present in the proposed Pipelines Act, which would
result in the amendment of Title 49, Section 60123(b) to include the
hae a e g
h, impeding the operation of, disrupting the
operation of, or inhibiting the operation of an interstate gas pipeline
fac
(e ha added). 212 Impeding and inhibiting the operation
of a gas pipeline have critically not been defined in the proposed
amendments, despite there being two separate subsections in the act
for definitions relating to pipelines and property damage thresholds,
respectively.213 The construction of this clause in the Pipelines Act
is critical, as it has perhaps the most extreme punishment of any of
the statutes examined in this context. Should an individual be found
to be impeding or inhibiting the operation of an interstate gas
pipeline under the Pipelines Act, then they could be punished with
up to twenty years in prison.214 Despite these hefty consequences,
there are no definitions offered for impeding, disrupting, or
inhibiting in the context of the Pipelines Act. 215

Id. See also Indian Entities Recognized by and Eligible to Receive Services
from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 84 Fed. Reg. 1200 (Feb. 1,
2019).
211 Hopper, supra note 208.
212 Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2019:
Section-by-Section Analysis and Legislative Text, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., (Mar. 5, 2019)
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/news/protecting-our-infrastructure-pipelines-andenhancing-safety-act-2019-section-section-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/VZ8MDZHW] (emphasis added).
213 Id.
214 Id. See also 49 U.S.C. § 60123(b).
215 Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2019:
Section-by-Section Analysis and Legislative Text, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., (Mar. 5, 2019)
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/news/protecting-our-infrastructure-pipelines-andenhancing-safety-act-2019-section-section-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/K322PJ89].
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In fact, none of the above laws, proposed or enacted, have
offered any kind of definition for their impeding and impairing
clauses. Without proper definition of these terms, there is no way to
reasonably determine whether an individual is impeding or
impairing the function or installation of pipelines. Not only do these
laws lack the requisite notice towards the public regarding
criminalized
conduct automatically
rendering
it
unconstitutional it lacks the narrow scope required by
constitutional First Amendment regulation; the clause automatically
renders these laws and bills overly vague. 216 In these contexts,
impede has not been federally defined, and there are no definitions
offered in-statute for any of the state or federal proposals. Would it,
under HB 3557, be illegal to protest the arrival of a backhoe, two
miles away from any pipeline or any pipeline-housing facility?
Would standing in the middle of a road qualify as impairing or
interrupting the operation of a critical infrastructure facility, or
impairing the operation of an interstate pipeline under the Pipelines
Act? What about preventing cars from entering the property of the
facility? Is that disrupting the operation of a pipeline under the
Pipelines Act? If they are on or off the property line, does it matter?
The egregious lack of specificity and extraordinary level of
vagueness in these statutes makes it impossible for any arbiter of
justice to effectively and constitutionally apply them, no matter the
case. When applying the requisite notice requirement, the impeding
and impairing clause alone renders more than half the statutes
examined in this paper unconstitutional.
While SB 189 in South Dakota lacks the impeding and
impairing clause, as it is more explicitly an anti-protest law rather
than a critical infrastructure law, it presents its own unique clause
which ensures it is unconstitutionally vague. SB 189 which was
constructed in direct and deliberate response to the #NoDAPL
protests ensures that a person (defined to include individuals, nonprofits, corporations, and other organizations) is criminalized if:
[J]ointly and severally with any other person . . . the
person:
Button, 371 U.S. at 432-33 ( a g [ ]he b ec
ab e a
f ag e e
and overbreadth does not depend upon absence of fair notice to a criminally
accused . . . but upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment
freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper
a
ca
).
216
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1) Participates in any riot and directs, advises,
encourages, or solicits any other person participating
in the riot to acts of force or violence;
2) Does not personally participate in any riot but
directs, advises, encourages, or solicits other persons
participating in the riot to acts of force or violence,
or;
3) Upon the direction, advice, encouragement, or
solicitation of any other person, uses force or
violence, or makes any threat to use force or
violence, if accompanied by immediate power of
execution, by three or more persons, acting together
and without authority of law . . . . 217
Wh e d ec
a d
c
ha e he
e -of-art
def
, he e f he
d ad e a d e c age
presents its own issues of overbroad language. Again, when no
definition is offered in statute, the canons of construction tell us to
turn to dictionaries.218 Merriam-Web e def e
ad e a
give someone a recommendation about what should be done; to give
ad ce
219 a d
e c age a , a
g he def
,
e h c age,
, h e. 220 In the rapidly transforming
era of social media and Internet communities, where Twitter,
Snapchat, and Instagram are as much a political platform as The Hill
or The New York Times, advising a riot could mean practically
anything. Practical examples range from retweeting a livestream of
a protest on Twitter, to sharing a Facebook post, to answering a
e
e
a e age b a d,
a
-profit director
sending an email suggesting that an employee remain one more day
at a protest action. 221 Without a properly enumerated, specific
S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb. 2019, § 2(1)-(3) (S.D. 2018) (emphasis
added).
218 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phlip P. Frickey, The Rehnquist Co r s
Canons of Statutory Construction, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994) (derived from
a e d
F
a d: La A E
b
).
219 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Advise, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/advise [https://perma.cc/CT6F-FWF6].
220 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Encourage, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/encourage [https://perma.cc/JEV2-J8F4].
221 A
a ed b he ACLU, [a]
e ca e
a
without any
e b b P a ff . C
a , Dakota Rural Action et al. v. Noem et al., at
16, (W.D. S.D., Mar. 28, 2019). A a ed b he ACLU, [a]
e ca e
into a riot
h
a
e b b P a ff . C
a , Dakota Rural
217
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definition, , the imagination runs wild, and the consequences equally
so.
South Dakota courts can find someone guilty of advising or
encouraging a riot in South Dakota without that person even being
present in-state. Thanks to the phrasing of the bill, both individuals
and groups could be found liable for encouraging protestors in any
way, regardless of whether or not the encouraging individual
ac a e gage
b
g he e e . 222 This could result
in thousands of people if not hundreds of thousands being subjected
S h Da a
dc
, ega d e
f he
e
a
culpability.
Due to their lack of clear definition, these phrases in both
state and federal law, enacted and proposed ensure that these laws
violate the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Their
vagueness emulates exactly the type of language described by the
Supreme Court in NAACP v. Button. Button sh ed ha
a da d
of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free
e e
...F , a a ga a e
hb
effec
such rights, this [Supreme] Court has not hesitated to take into
account possible applications of the statute in other factual contexts
be de ha a ba . 223 If a law is so vague as to be used to penalize
those who are exercising their constitutional rights to free speech,
free association, and protest, then that law is unconstitutional. While
it is understandable, as the South Dakota legislature points out, to
restrict and criminalize deliberately starting or encouraging a riot,
the terms described in this statute are too vague and confusing for a
judge to adequately litigate the matter.224 The solution, as put
forward in Hicks and Reno, is to end enforcement of the entire law
so long as one aspect of it remains unconstitutional, and to limit or
partially invalidate the construction of each law as to not allow state
or federal legislatures to violate the First Amendment rights of
advocates.225 The da ge de c bed b J ce B e a
f he
existence of a penal statute susceptible to sweeping and improper

Action et al. v. Kristi Noem et al., Case 5:19-cv-05026-LLP, at *16. (W.D. S.D.,
Mar. 28, 2019).
222 S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb., § 2-3 (S.D. 2019, § 23); S.B. 189, 94th
Sess., Leg. Assemb. 2019, § 2-3 (S.D. 2018).
223 Button, 371 U.S. at 432.
224 S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb.., § 2-3 (S.D. 2019).S.B. 189, 94th Sess.,
Leg. Assemb. 2019, § 23 (S.D. 2018).
225 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003).
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a
ca
c ea a
cab e he e. 226 To fulfill the requirements
of Supreme Court precedent, this would, by necessity, mean an
immediate severing of each of the impeding and impairing clauses
of each of these laws, and the advising and encouraging clause in
SB 189.
HB 1123, SB 2044, HB 3557, and the Pipelines Act are all
unconstitutionally vague. Whether they include the overly vague
impeding or impairing clause, or the equally vague advising and
encouraging clause, all four of them have been found to be so
imprecise as to intrude on the right to free speech of both individuals
and organizations. Without the immediate severing and cleansing of
these unconstitutional clauses from the texts of these statutes, these
four laws will continue to unconstitutionally cut broad swaths out of
the First Amendment rights of protestors in the relevant states and
violate Indigenous civil rights.
2. These Critical Infrastructure/Anti-Protest Laws are
Unconstitutionally Overbroad
Each of the laws analyzed above are unconstitutional on
their face based solely on their overly vague, misleading clauses.
However, in one of them HB 3557 in Texas there is an
additional issue. Termed the above or below clause, it is notable not
in its presence but in its absence. HB 3557, like HB 727 in
Louisiana, lacks a proper definition of what makes a gas or oil
pipeline into a critical infrastructure site protected by law. Both
these bills both of which have been codified do not properly
define whether these protected pipelines must be above or belowground. This results in both HB 3557 in Texas and HB 727 in
Louisiana227 being overbroad and thus blatantly unconstitutional.
Texas bill HB 3557 states:
424.001. Def
. I
h
cha e , c ca
f a c e fac
ha he ea g assigned by
Section 423.0045(a)(1-a) and also includes:
(1) any pipeline transporting oil or gas or the
products or constituents of oil or gas; and
Button, 371 U.S. at 432-33.
One thing which must be noted about HB 727 is that it does not contain an
impeding and impairing clause. Unfortunately, this does not make it
constitutional.
226
227
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(2) a facility or pipeline described by this section that
is under construction and all equipment and
appurtenances used during that construction . . . 228
Section 423.0045(a)(1-a)(B)(i)-( ) c de a
f
a ab eg
d [ c] , ga , che ca
e e
ts definition
of critical infrastructure. 229 However, the section also clearly states
ha
e e
be e c ed b a fe ce
he h ca ba e
b
de g ed
e c de
de ; he ca
be
extant along the side of the road in order to be fully protected by the
definition of a critical infrastructure site. 230
Section 424.001, as introduced in HB 3557, does not contain
h
a f e . HB 3557 c de a
e ine transporting oil or
ga
def
f a c ca f a ructure site, as well as a
e e h ch
de c
c
a de e
ece f e
e
which can be used during that construction. 231 The use of the term
a
e e d e
c ea d ffe e a e be ee ab e- and
below-ground lines. In fact, the construction of Section 424.001(1)
seems to deliberately encompass both above-and below-ground
pipelines, especially when read in conjunction with Section
424.001(2) which extends that protection to any kind of equipment
used to install the pipeline. 232
While the definition of critical infrastructure presents issues
of vagueness and unconstitutionality outside of First Amendment
doctrine it could be argued to be void for vagueness under Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment precedent233 it is also critical to note
that this lack of definition unconstitutionally intrudes on free speech
rights of individuals. The state of Texas is currently home to more
than 225,000 miles of pipelines, per the Texas Pipeline Awareness
Alliance.234 Most of these pipes have been installed underground,
H.B. 3557, 86th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Tx. 2019) (emphasis added); H.B.
3557, 86th Leg. Sess. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019) (emphasis added).
229 TEX. GOV T CODE § 423.0045(a)(1-a)(B) (2019).
230 Id.
231 H.B. 3557, 86th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Tx. 2019); H.B. 3557, 86th Leg.
Sess. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019).
232 Id.
233 See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018); Johnson v. United States,
135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
234 Tex. Pipeline Awareness All., Pipelines: Where Are They?,
https://www.pipeline-safety.org/pipelines-where-they-are/
[https://perma.cc/Z63G-N268].
228
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and have few visible markers.235 Without adequate notice in-statute
of whether below-ground pipelines constitute as critical
infrastructure sites under HB 3557, anti-oil protestors anywhere in
the state might be trespassing with the inten
a
e
the function of the pipeline-- simply by standing on top of a manhole
cover.236 Additionally, HB 3557 neglects to establish what amount
f ace a
d he
e e c
de ed a f he
e e
legal terms. Would standing near a pipeline constitute as trespassing
on it? Would protesting ten feet from a pipeline count as trespass
under the statute and thus result in criminal charges? Due to its lack
of narrow application, HB 3557 intrudes on constitutionally
protected free speech. It is too broad, and results in the potential
criminalization of anyone who so much as trods on a sidewalk.
HB 3557 is overbroad even without considering the aboveand below-ground clause. By defining a pipeline as not only the
completed pipeline itself, but also a pipeline during its
construction
c d g a e
e a d a
e a ce
ed
d
g ha c
c
the state of Texas seeks to prevent any
form of protest against the construction of new pipelines. 237 This
means that protests e h e a Ma a Kea Ha a , g g a
of this writing, would result in criminalization and jail time. 238 The
allegory is not perfect the Mauna Kea protests are against the
installation of a telescope on a holy site, not an oil pipeline beneath
a reservoir but a group of Indigenous protestors blocking off a
road to prevent access to trucks and bulldozers would certainly
qualify as a state jail crime in Texas.
Much like the pipelines in Texas, most of the 125,000 miles
of pipeline in the state of Louisiana are not clearly marked. 239
Pipelines are generally below-ground for convenience purposes, but
this means that most of the general public have no clue where
pipelines even gas and oil pipelines actually are. Like HB 3557,
HB 727 in Louisiana, codified into law at R.S. 14:61 and 14:61.1,
neglects to differentiate between above- and below-ground
Id.
See H.B. 3557, 86th Leg. Sess. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019).
237 H.B. 3557, 86th Leg. Sess. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019).
238 See Maui News, Thousand Take to The Streets to Protest TMT, MAUI NEWS
(Aug. 10, 2019 5:17 PM), https://mauinow.com/2019/08/10/thousands-take-tothe-streets-to-protest-tmt/ [https://perma.cc/76HU-9TB4]; see also TEX. PENAL
CODE § 12.35(a) (2019).
239 Complaint, White Hat et al. v. Jeff Landry et al., at 1-2, (M.D. La., May 22,
2019).
235
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pipelines. The text of the law reads:
61. Unauthorized entry of a critical infrastructure.
B. For the purposes of this Section, the following
words shall have the following meanings:
(1) C ca
fa c e
ea
a
a d a
structures, equipment, or other immovable or
movable property located upon chemical
manufacturing facilities, refineries, electrical power
facilities . . . pipelines . . . or any site where the
construction or improvement of any facility or
structure referenced in this Section is occurring . . .
(3) Pipeline means flow, transmission, distribution,
or gathering lines, regardless of size or length, which
transmit and transport oil, gas, petrochemicals,
minerals or water in a solid, liquid, or gaseous
state.240
Stepping onto ground or a sidewalk which contains or covers a
pipeline, knowingly or unknowingly, could at this point result in a
guilty sentence of up to five years in prison, with or without labor,
as well as monetary fines. 241 In the free speech context, this lack of
definition makes HB 727 and its accompanying amendments
unconstitutionally overbroad, which is clearly prohibited by NAACP
v. Button, Reno, and Hicks.242 This has already resulted in the arrest
of at least six people in Louisiana, some of whom were protesting
the installation of the Bayou Bridge Pipeline. 243
For this reason, both of these laws must be immediately
repealed or rewritten to satisfy the requirement for narrow
application.244 As they stand now, they intrude without appropriate
cause into territory that is supposed to be protected by the First
Amendment right of free speech.

LA. REV. STAT. § 14:61(C) (2018).
Id.
242 Button, 371 U.S. at 415; ACLU, 521 U.S. at 844; Hicks, 539 U.S. at 113.
243 Complaint, White Hat et al. v. Jeff Landry et al., at 23-24, (M.D. La., May
22, 2019) (describing arrests that have occurred since HB 727 was enacted into
law).
244 539 U.S. at 113.
240
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3. These Critical Infrastructure/Anti-Protest Laws
Unconstitutionally Limit Free Speech and Freedom of
Association for Legal Organizations in South Dakota
and Oklahoma
In addition to their vagueness and overbreadth, two of the
six laws described above have an even more insidious impact on
First Amendment rights. SB 189 in South Dakota and HB 1123 in
Oklahoma unconstitutionally infringe on the freedom of association
of both individuals and organizations. This constitutional freedom
is enumerated in the First Amendment and protected by Supreme
Court precedent; the subsections of each of the above bills and their
accompanying codified statutes violates the U.S. Constitution and
criminalizes personal and organizational support of Indigenous
protest.
As discussed in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the likelihood of
whether certain speech may incite violence does not automatically
remove that speech from the protection of the First Amendment. 245
The intent of the speaker, the likelihood of the speech resulting in
violence, and/or the actual imminence of violence occurring because
of the speech, must each be considered in determining whether that
speech can be legally regulated. 246 The South Dakotan riot boosting
statute SB 189 amends does not describe actions which reach that
level of regulation.
SB 189, signed into law in March of this year, states that
individuals or organizations can be held liable to the state of South
Dakota if that person:
[J]ointly and severally with any other person . . . the
person:
1) Participates in any riot and directs, advises,
encourages, or solicits any other person participating
in the riot to acts of force or violence;
2) Does not personally participate in any riot but
directs, advises, encourages, or solicits other persons
participating in the riot to acts of force or violence,
or;
3) Upon the direction, advice, encouragement, or
245
246

395 U.S. at 446, 449.
Id.
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solicitation of any other person, uses force or
violence, or makes any threat to use force or
violence, if accompanied by immediate power of
execution, by three or more persons, acting together
and without authority of law . . . . 247
Aga , e
de h ac c de
d d a ,
but non-profits, LLCs, corporations, partnerships, or any other
group.248 It could even include a tribe under federal Indian law; the
def
c de a g
ac g a a
de
ea
def
,a d
h h ee a
dge c d e e a g
a
ea a
be h d hat group be involved in setting up a
protest.
At this point, without further narrowing of the definition, it
is impossible to say whether the law could be used to attack
Indigenous tribes and groups for protesting the installation of gas or
oil pipelines on or near tribal jurisdiction. What is certain is that this
liability extends to anyone who provides any kind of advice or
e c age e
d d a a c a g a
( h ee
e
persons committing or threatening to commit acts of violence),
regardless of whether that person is in the state of South Dakota. 249
Justifiably, organizations which supported the Standing Rock
protestors now fear that they can be held liable for the actions of
individuals in another state regardless of whether those
individuals have actually rioted, or have merely been exercising
their constitutional right to free speech and assembly.
SB 189 also has the distinct characteristic of lacking any
kind of required intent to commit an unlawful act in any part of the
behavior it criminalizes.250 There is no mens rea in the statute, and
thus no way to analyze the intent of the individual or organization
charged with riot boosting. By neglecting to provide a required
intent in-statute, South Dakota has criminalized the freedom of
individuals and organizations to associate with other individuals or
organizations, either in or out of the state. A simple conversation
S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb.., § 2(1)-(3) (S.D. 2019) (emphasis
added).S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb. 2019, § 2(1)-(3) (S.D. 2018)
(emphasis added).
248 S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb.., § 1(2) (S.D. 2019).S.B. 189, 94th Sess.,
Leg. Assemb. 2019, § 1(2) (S.D. 2018).
249 Id.
250 S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb. (S.D. 2019).S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg.
Assemb. 2019 (S.D. 2018).
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might result in the attribution of criminal charges to a person or
organization that had no intent to commit any sort of unlawful act,
and which has never even once been in South Dakota.
Unlike what is required by Supreme Court precedent in
Brandenburg, SB 189 does not consider the intent of the speaker,
the likelihood of violence resulting from the speech, or the
likelihood of violence actually occurring in examining riot
boosting.251 Any protest can become a riot given the right triggers,
but that does not necessarily mean what people say or do on social
media will force it to occur. 252 Criminalizing people who are not
even in the state for encouraging or advising people involved in a
massive protest does not follow the terms set forth in
Brandenburg.253 By analyzing the speech not only of those people
involved in a protest, but those advising or encouraging from the
sidelines (or from the other side of the world), SB 189 not only
violates the constitutional protection of free speech, but also the
constitutional right of freedom of association. 254
SB 189 a , a
h a g,
ae a
ga a
gh
to freedom of association by overtly criminalizing the interaction
between an individual and an organization within the context of a
lawful protest. The Supreme Court states in NAACP v. Alabama that
[e]ffec e ad cac f b h b c a d
ae
f e ,
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group
a ca
. 255 Similarly, in Kusper v. Pontikes, the Supreme Court
declared ha a g f ca e c ach e
a ca
a
freedom cannot be justified upon a mere showing of a legitimate
a e e e . 256 Whether a person chooses to associate with an
organization or political party is entirely their own affair, and that
right to choose is protected by both the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. As per NAACP v. Button, the actions of a legal or
litigative organization cannot be limited by a state law which
f ge
a
ga a
f eed
a cae
h d d a

Id.; 395 U.S. at 446, 449.
Complaint, Dakota Rural Action et al. v. Kristi Noem et al., at 16, (W.D.
S.D., Mar. 28, 2019).
253 S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb. (S.D. 2019); 395 U.S. at 446, 449.S.B.
189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb. 2019 (S.D. 2018); 395 U.S. at 446, 449.
254 U.S. CONST. amend. I; S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb. (S.D. 2019). U.S.
CONST. amend. I; S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb. 2019 (S.D. 2018).
255 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
256 414 U.S. at 59.
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who may need their services. 257 I
d g
a
ga a
freedom of association via overbroad or overly vague language is
unconstitutional, particularly regarding issues that involve
litigation.258
SB 189 impugns the right of legal organizations to freedom
of association by criminalizing the solicitation of an individual by
a
ga a
e f ce
e ce, [ a e] a h ea to use
f ce
e ce. 259 While this sounds positive, in a protest
a
, ae e
f ha a e f ce e c
de
e ce
a be
h g
e ha a
e cha ( .e. f c ICE, chinga
la migra, d
T
, he , he , h , h , Ka a a gh has got to
g ). I he
e c e , f ce a
a
ac a
be
extant and as noted in Brandenburg, even statements which may
appear to advocate the use of force or violence frequently lack the
requisite intent.260 Regardless, the criminalization of solicitation of
words or actions in a protest context is almost a direct mirror to the
kind of legal obfuscation found in NAACP v. Button, which the
Supreme Court ruled to unconstitutionally violate the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.261
Unlike South Dakota, Oklahoma does not expressly impute
liability to organizations or individuals who did not actively
participate in a protest. However, HB 1123 does have a clause which
states:
C. If an organization is found to be a conspirator with
persons who are found to have committed any of the
crimes described in subsection A or B of this section,
the conspiring organization shall be punished by a
fine that is ten times the amount of said fine
authorized by the appropriate provision of this
section.262
Subsection A of HB 1123 states that any person who willfully
trespasses or enters a critical infrastructure facility shall be fined no

521 U.S. at 844.
Id.
259 Id.; S.B. 189, 94th Sess., Leg. Assemb. 2019 (S.D. 2019).
260 395 U.S. at 449.
261 521 U.S. AT 844: U.S. CONST. amend. I, XIV.
262 H.B. 1123, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. § C (Okla. 2017).
257
258
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less than a thousand dollars, jailed for up to six months, or both. 263
If that person is found to have meant to damage or tamper with
equipment or impede the function of the facility, then they can be
fined up to ten thousand dollars and imprisoned for up to a year. 264
Section B decrees that any person who damages or tampers with
equipment shall be fined a hundred thousand dollars, imprisoned for
not more than ten years, or both. 265
This obviously presents problems for any organization that
f
d ha e bee a c
a
ha
d d a h , de
S b ec
A f HB 1123, f
d ha e
eded
h b ed
the functions of a critical infrastructure facility. 266 The fines and jail
time can come to a total of ten thousand dollars meaning that for
an organization found to have conspired with a protestor, the
monetary consequences can be up to a hundred thousand dollars,
which few non-profit or legal aid organizations can afford. If the
protestor has actually done any damage to the site, the fine could be
ten times that.267 Depending on which section the individual has
been charged with, this can result in up to a million dollar fine
g ed a
ga a
f
d ha e c
ed
h ha
individual. For organizations such as the Indigenous Environmental
Network, Water Protector Legal Collective, and others, this could
mean hefty if not impossible fines owed to South Dakota and all
for something that should not even be attributed to them in the first
place.
A f 2019, O ah a a e def e c
g a :
First, an agreement by two or more persons,
Second, to commit [the Crime or Conduct Charged].
Third, the defendant(s) (was/were [a] part[ies] to the
agreement at the time it was made)/(knowingly
became [a] party(ies) to the agreement at some time
after it was made.
Fourth, an overt act by one or more of the parties
performed subsequent to the formation of the

H.B. 1123, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. § A (Okla. 2017).
Id.
265 H.B. 1123, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. § B (Okla. 2017).
266 H.B. 1123, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. § A (Okla. 2017).
267 H.B. 1123, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017).
263
264

109

agreement.268
Under this framework, it would be simple to find an organization
guilty of conspiracy to organize a protest that, through the intentions
of no one involved, devolved into a riot. NAACP v. Button clearly
illustrates that legal organizations, particularly those involved in
litigation, are allowed to associate with individuals that may wind
up requiring legal services from them in the future. 269 If the NAACP
could actively recommend the use of legal aid organizations via
speaking with those who have had their constitutional rights
violated, then the Indigenous Environmental Network can speak to
Indigenous protestors regarding the destruction of the environment
on their reservations. HB 1123, however, creates million-dollar
consequences.
O ah a
a e ha been described as one that is meant
ca e ff
-profits and legal organizations that intend to aid
legal protestors against pipelines. A city attorney in Oklahoma City
be e e
a a ed
da e a d h ea e a
ga a
that might organize a nonviolent, non-disruptive political
e . 270 Proof beyond theories is difficult. However, in the wake
of Standing Rock and the many thousands of people, individually
and in groups, who provided aid to Indigenous and non-indigenous
protestors at the camps, the reason why such a clause might be
written into a critical infrastructure statute begins to emerge.
SB 189 and HB 1123 create criminal and financial penalties
for individuals and organizations which choose to associate with or
even speak to d d a f
d
ha e bee
b
g
trespassing on critical infrastructure property in their states. In the
case of SB 189, individuals and organizations need not even be instate for the penalties to be levied against them. This is not only a
clear violation of First Amendment precedent against vague and
overbroad language in the policing of free speech, but also of the
F
a d F
ee h A e d e
c b ed
ec
f he
right of freedom of association. 271 As per Reno and Hicks, the only
Okla. Unif. Jury Instr. CR 2-17 (quoted in United States v. Wartson, 772 Fed.
Appx. 751, 756 (10th Cir. 2019)).
269 Button, 371 U.S. at 429.
270 Staff, In wake of environmental protests, legislation aims to protect critical
infrastructure 2017, GEO. UNIV.: THE FREE SPEECH PROJECT (Aug. 22, 2017,
12:00AM) http://freespeechproject.georgetown.domains/state-and-localgovernment/oklahoma-house-bill-1123/.
271 U.S. CONST. amend. I, XIV.
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solution for both South Dakota and Oklahoma is to suspend
enforcement of these laws and invalidate the subsections which
overtly criminalize free speech and freedom of association. 272
Without doing so, they run the risk of violating the First Amendment
rights of not only citizens of their own states, but of citizens all over
the U.S.
4. The Protections of the First Amendment in These
Critical Infrastructure/Anti-Protest Laws are
Insufficient to Make Them Constitutional
Perhaps to their credit, two of the six laws examined above
include subsections nominally meant to protect the First
Amendment rights of assembly, free speech, and protest.
Specifically, SB 2044 in North Dakota and HB 727 in Louisiana
de be a e c
c ace f
a f a e b a d peaceful and
de
e
h he c
c
f he a e .273 If taken
at face-value, these subsections may be used to protect protestors,
especially Indigenous protestors, from unfair targeting and
criminalization
by
state
governments.
However,
the
unconstitutional breadth and vagueness of each of these statutes
render these supposed protections completely toothless. Even if they
facially include constitutional protections, the impact of both these
laws results in the unconstitutional violation of the First
Amendment, rendering their supposedly enumerated protections
entirely pointless.
The text of SB 2044 in North Dakota reads,
This section may not be construed to prevent or
prohibit lawful assembly and peaceful and orderly
petition for the redress of grievances, including a
labor dispute between an employer and its
employee.274
Similarly, HB 727 has a subsection which reads:
D. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to apply
521 U.S. at 844; 539 U.S. at 113.
S.B. 2044, 66th Leg. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2019); H.B. 727, 2018 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (La. 2018).
274 S.B. 2044, 66th Leg. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2019).
272
273
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to or prevent the following:
(1) Lawful assembly and peaceful and orderly
petition, picketing, or demonstration for the redress
of grievances or to express ideas and views regarding
legitimate matters of public interest, including any
labor dispute between any employer and its
employee or position protected by the United States
Constitution or the Constitution of Louisiana. 275
While these subsections appear to protect First Amendment rights
of rights of assembly, free speech, and protest, when read in
conjunction with the rest of the associated laws, these protections
lack any kind of bite. It is impossible to protect the dearly loved
liberties of free speech and freedom of assembly while
simultaneously constructing statutes in a manner that is so vague
and overbroad that regular behavior becomes criminalized. It is
simply unconstitutional to enact criminal penalties for online
retweets, encouraging texts, standing beside an unmarked pipeline
with a protest sign, or accepting fiduciary support of protestors from
organizations such as EarthJustice, the Sierra Club, or the ACLU.276
The two concepts of free speech and speech restriction do not and
cannot line up.
SB 2044 explicitly states in a subsection that it cannot be
used to prevent peaceful and orderly protest. 277 Simultaneously,
however, the construction of the remainder of the statute is so vague
and overbroad that it could ensure the devastation of a right to
peaceful protest. 278 The impeding or impairing clause in SB 2044
means that any person who does anything that could make any kind
of trouble for those installing or monitoring a pipeline could be
charged with criminal trespass. 279 Providing a subsection in-statute
claiming to offer an opportunity for people to exercise their right to
free speech while concurrently ensnaring anyone who comes
anywhere near a critical infrastructure facility to exercise their right
H.B. 727, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2018).
See id.; see also Jonathan Parks-Ramage, Tr mp s An i-Environment Agenda
Makes 2018 the Perfect Time to Support These Climate Orgs, VICE (Mar. 6,
2018, 11:30 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/437mpq/trumps-antienvironment-agenda-makes-2018-the-perfect-time-to-support-these-climate-orgs
[https://perma.cc/K45S-5QVP].
277 See S.B. 2044, 66th Leg. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2019).
278 See id.
279 See id.
275
276
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to free speech is both an absurd logical fallacy and blatantly
unconstitutional.
HB 727 is another example of this conundrum. While HB
727 pays lip service to the notion of protecting First Amendment
free speech rights, it is simultaneously being used and was
designed to be used as a tool against the First Amendment.
Implementation of HB 727 has already prevented those individuals
who choose to protest the installation of oil pipelines from
exercising their right to free speech by criminalizing their actions as
the endangerment of critical infrastructure. 280 HB 727 attempts to
pay some kind of false homage to the First Amendment by
specifically carving ou ace f
a f a e b a d eacef a d
de
e
, b he fac e a
ha ha
bee a
ed
a way that protects those rights. 281 Within a week of HB 727 being
put into effect, Indigenous protestor Anna White Hat, teacher and
activist Ramon Mejía, and journalist Karen Savage, had been
arrested for standing not on--but near the pipeline.282 White Hat was
a e ed af e ead g a a e ce e
f
-violent protest
aga
a d
g f he
e e
ec
he A chafa a a
Basin.283 This occurred even though White Hat and her fellow
e
e e a d g e dea
g be
b c ae a
a d/
e
he e he had a h
a
be, a d
private land.284 At the time, the Bayou Bridge Pipeline, LLC was
illegally clearing and constructing on land they did not have
permission to enter. 285 A he e
a
ega gh f a
e e ce, a d he ef e
c ca f a c e, Wh e Ha a d
others were arrested for simply standing near or observing a pipeline
that was being illegally constructed. Due to raising their voices in
opposition to the pipeline, White Hat and her comrades were
arrested by state and local law enforcement officers that had been
hired by the Bayou Bridge Pipeline LLC to act as security.286
Both White Hat and Savage currently face up to ten years in

Complaint, Anna White Hat et al. v. Jeff Landry et al., at 7-8, (M.D. La., May
22, 2019).
281 H.B. 727, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2018).
282 Complaint, Anna White Hat et al. v. Jeff Landry et al., at 7-8, (M.D. La., May
22, 2019).
283 Id. at 7.
284 Id. at 21.
285 Id.
286 Id. at 23, 26.
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prison and at least $2000 in fines. 287 All three of them Anna White
Hat, Ramon Mejía, and Karen Savage were exercising their First
Amendment rights at the time of their arrest. The subsection in HB
727 meant to protect free speech was ineffective against the vague
and overbroad clauses present in the rest of the statute.
While the state legislatures in North Dakota and Louisiana
attempt to hide the blatant unconstitutionality of their critical
infrastructure laws behind protective clauses, the reality is that both
these laws lack the sort of teeth that could provide any real defense.
As noted in previous sections, these laws are both so vague and so
overbroad that it would be impossible to truly differentiate
constitutionally protected free speech and protest from any kind of
criminal trespass or violation of the statutes.288 Enforcement of these
laws must be suspended, as per Reno, and the vague and overbroad
clauses in each of these statutes must, as per Hicks, be limited or
invalidated in order to provide true and valid protections of First
Amendment rights in both North Dakota and Louisiana. 289
Similarly, once the unconstitutional clauses are severed, sections
which protect the First Amendment must also be added to each of
the other statutes examined above to fully provide protection for
those protesting oil and gas pipeline installation across the United
States.
These Critical Infrastructure/Anti-Protest Laws Fulfill A Long
Tradition of the Chilling of the Free Speech and Civil Rights of
Indigenous Peoples
Holistically, all six of these laws HB 1123 in Oklahoma;
SB 2044 in North Dakota; SB 189 in South Dakota, HB 3557 in
Texas; HB 727 in Louisiana, and the Pipelines Act put forward by
state and federal governments are unconstitutional for a variety of
reasons. Either they are too vague to properly limit free speech, they
are so overbroad as to criminalize free speech and association, or
they are unconstitutionally limiting the use of free speech and
freedom of association. Historically, the Supreme Court has closely
analyzed restrictions on free speech and freedom of association, and
Supreme Court precedent makes each of the laws above
Id.
See infra Part IV.A.1-3.
289 ACLU, 521 U.S. at 844; Hicks, 539 U.S. at 113.
287
288
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unconstitutional. However, each of these laws also play into a
longstanding tradition in the United States of limiting or chilling the
civil rights of Indigenous peoples in the U.S.
At first glance, the described laws do not actively target
Indigenous peoples. However, the rhetoric around each of these
laws plays into stereotypes which have previously been evident in
lawmaking trends such as assimilation and termination. In
Oklahoma, the sponsor of HB 1123, Representative Scott Biggs,
openly admitted that the law had been developed to prevent any
protest similar to the one that occurred at Standing Rock from ever
happening in the state of Oklahoma. 290 While developing the bill in
conjunction with the Oklahoma Oil and Gas Association, Rep. Scott
stated
he H e f
ha [ ]he e a e a
f h g
O ah a gh
ha a e d a g he a e
f bad ac ,
meaning Indigenous and environmental activists.291 He also
claimed that protests such as the one in Standing Rock were
e a d disruptive, and that it was important to pass HB 1123
in order to prevent similar things from happening in the state of
Oklahoma.292
During testimony before the South Dakota legislature in
f HB 1123, G e
N e
bb
e f ed ha a
catalyst for the Act was the fact that some of the people who
participated in the protest at Standing Rock in North Dakota were
fe
a
e
f
he
a
f he c
. 293
S
a , L
a a, LMOGA P e de a d Ge e a C
e,
T e G a , h d af ed HB 727, a ed ha he f
ed
O ah a
e , a g
h he O ah a O a d Ga
Association, adapting their approach to the existing critical
infrastructu e a
L
a a. 294 ALEC
d af ed c ca
infrastructure bill closely mirrors the Oklahoma statute as well, and
Joe Wertz, Oklahoma Bill To Pro ec Cri ical Infras r c re Co ld C rb
Public Protest, Critics Say, STATE IMPACT: NAT L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 2, 2017,
12:09 PM), https://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/2017/03/02/oklahoma-bill-toprotect-critical-infrastructure-could-curb-public-protest-critics-say/
[https://perma.cc/C7FD-RC2G].
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Complaint, Dakota Rural Action et al. v. Kristi Noem et al., at 8, (W.D. S.D.,
Mar. 28, 2019).Complaint, Dakota Rural Action et al. v. Kristi Noem et al., Case
No. 5:19-cv-5046 (W.D. S.D., Mar. 28, 2019), *8.
294 Complaint, Anna White Hat et al. v. Jeff Landry et al., at 17, (M.D. La., May
22, 2019). Complaint, Anna White Hat et al. v. Jeff Landry et al., Case No. 3:19cv-00322, *17 (M.D. La., May 22, 2019).
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shares many of the clauses that were developed in response to those
e
bad ac
de c bed b Re . B gg .295 Notably, in
Texas, the authors of HB 3557 attended ALEC conferences within
the past few years; multiple oil companies in Texas, including the
Texas Oil and Gas Association, the Texas Pipeline Association,
ExxonMobil, Chevron, Shell, and Enbridge also supported the
bill.296 State legislators are cooperating with oil companies over the
First Amendment rights of the residents of their state.
Each of these statements on its own, while troublesome, do
not engender much cause for concern. However, when viewed in the
context of federal and state legislation against Indigenous peoples
throughout American history, these claims take on a new and
uncomfortable implication. The history of suppression of
Indigenous protest in the United States, both before and after the
enshrinement of Indigenous civil rights via the Indian Citizenship
Act, were characterized with similar language. The descriptions of
e ce
e
a
age f I d ge
e e
h ch ha
existed for centuries. Critical infrastructure/anti-protest laws imply
the existence of a battle between backwardsg,
c
ed
Indigenous peoples and forwardg, c
ed
a d ga
companies, with the government pushing for Indigenous
assimilation to the motives of state legislatures and their
accompanying oil and gas lobbyists.297 Historically, when
Indigenous people fought back, they were killed, but as the
relocation era ended and allotment began, the punishment changed
instead to denial.298 Indigenous people could not use their own
languages, exercise their own cultures, or live in their own historical
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin., Protecting Our
Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2019: Section-bySection Analysis and Legislative Text, (Mar. 5, 2019),
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/news/71476/2019pipeline-safety-reauthorization_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HVC-N3VS];
Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2019:
Section-by-Section Analysis and Legislative Text, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., (Mar. 5, 2019)
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/news/protecting-our-infrastructure-pipelines-andenhancing-safety-act-2019-section-section-analysis/[ https://perma.cc/KNY4BUNM].
296 Candice Bernd, Pipeline Protesters Could Face 10 Years in Prison Under
Bill OK d b Te as Ho se, TEX. OBSERVER (May 1, 2019, 1:57 PM),
https://www.texasobserver.org/pipeline-protesters-could-face-20-years-inprison-under-bill-in-texas-house/ [https://perma.cc/UA7T-4PWF].
297 See The Dawes Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (repealed).
298 See DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 3, at 112-14, 138-39.
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homelands.299 These critical infrastructure/anti-protest laws and the
rhetoric behind them, harken back to an era when Indigenous
e e
e e de c bed a
ch d h b
a e a d fede a
governments, and their territories were cut up into allotments and
sold off to outside peoples.300 The upsurge of critical
infrastructure/anti-protest law echoes a time when the organizations
AIM and WARN pushed back against federal and state policies
which kept Indigenous peoples in poverty.301 Even during the rise
of Red Power, hundreds of Indigenous peoples were being arrested
and charged with criminal actions. The occupation of Wounded
Knee alone resulted in more than a thousand arrests and at least 275
criminal charges though admittedly there were violent clashes
between AIM activists and law enforcement prior to the end of the
occupation.302 Now, in an administration which has removed any
mention of climate change from government websites and
constantly and consistently rolls back environmental protection laws
in favor of fossil fuel and fracking companies, the U.S. is gearing up
for another massive fight not just over the environment, but over
the civil rights of Indigenous peoples.303
Indigenous peoples have used their First Amendment right
to religious freedoms to carve out space for Indigenous religious and
spiritual practices across the U.S. Now, through the use of mass
protest, Indigenous peoples are utilizing their First Amendment
rights of free speech and freedom of association to demand
indigenized environmental justice, and state and federal legislatures
have taken notice. By crafting laws which violate the First
Amendment rights not only of Indigenous activists, but journalists
and other protestors, each of these states and the federal government
See generally DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 3.
See WILKINSON, supra note 76, at 46.
301 See GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 116-17; see Alysa Landry, Native
History: AIM Occupation of Wounded Knee Begins, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY
(Feb. 27, 2017) https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/native-historyaim-occupation-of-wounded-knee-begins-8Ub_qxe5TkRPjNdSvvYDQ/[https://perma.cc/473J-7SWK];
302 Alysa Landry, Native History: AIM Occupation of Wounded Knee Begins,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Feb. 27, 2017)
https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/native-history-aimoccupation-of-wounded-knee-begins-8Ub_qxe5Tk-RPjNdSvvYDQ/ [
https://perma.cc/473J-7SWK].
303 Nadja Popovich et al., 83 Environmental Rules Being Rolled Back Under
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (updated June 7, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/climate/trump-environmentrollbacks.html [https://perma.cc/TA7D-5GNU].
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continue to perpetuate the chilling of Indigenous free speech and
Indigenous civil rights. This repackaged attitude towards
Indigenous peoples, particularly Indigenous peoples acting in the
political sphere, has reaped the same old consequences.
The withholding of civil rights protections from Indigenous
peoples has been essentially the norm for much of U.S. history.
Indigenous peoples were subjected to colonization, genocide,
termination, and assimilation. Indigenous children have been denied
their culture, history, land, sacred sites, and native languages. Now,
state and federal lawmakers are attempting to chill Indigenous
e e
gh
f ee eech a d f eed
f a ca
. The
restriction of Indigenous First Amendment Rights is just another
step in a long road of repressing Indigenous civil rights one that
must be reversed as soon as possible.
These Critical Infrastructure/Anti-Protest Laws Have a
Disparate Impact on Indigenous Peoples
Indigenous people are, have been, and will continue to be
leaders in the anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist environmental justice
movement. From the Keweenaw Bay Band Chippewa and Yakama
Nation of the Pacific Northwest, to the Indigenous women of
WARN who founded the Camp of Sacred Stones, Indigenous
peoples have driven the environmental justice movement to new
heights and demanded the defense and preservation of the
environment for future generations. 304 This means that there have
been, are, and will continue to be extensive conflict between
Indigenous peoples of the United States and the U.S. government
both at the federal and state levels.
Indigenous peoples have already borne state and federal
retaliation against anti-capitalist environmental justice movements.
More than four hundred people were arrested at Standing Rock.305
Not all of them were Indigenous, but a great number of them were,
and the few remaining in federal prison or under supervision with

See GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 116-17; see WILKINSON, supra note
76, at 165.
305 Colin Moynihan, A Murky Legal Mess at Standing Rock, THE NEW YORKER
(Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/people-arrestedat-standing-rock-protests-fight-for-their-legal-rights.
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criminal charges certainly are. 306 Anna White Hat may be sentenced
to up to ten years in prison for taking photos of illegal pipeline
construction.307 It cannot and should not be said that any of these
laws were written to deliberately discriminate against Indigenous
peoples. The construction of the laws themselves would indicate that
they were not. Even if they were developed in response to the
#NoDAPL protests at Standing Rock, the laws were constructed to
criminalize as many people as possible for protesting gas and oil
pipelines. However, the impact of these laws will have a disparate
impact on Indigenous peoples, rendering them unconstitutional in
their application and thus illegal under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Trump administration continues
to push for the commercialization of public and tribal lands it is
likely that that disparate impact will grow.
Precedent set in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) and extending
on throughout past decades have determined that laws which are
race-neutral upon their face but are racially biased in application are
unconstitutional.308 There is no space and no proper place in this
paper for a full Fourteenth Amendment racial bias analysis. Without
going further into the issue, it is clear that there is a risk of these
critical infrastructure laws having a disparate impact on Indigenous
peoples.309 The critical infrastructure/anti-protest laws discussed
have been constructed to ensnare those attempting to exercise their
First Amendment right to free speech and protest, but as the
Indigenous environmental justice movement progresses, the
likelihood of Indigenous individuals being criminalized is high.
Indeed, Indigenous peoples around the world including the United
States stand at the forefront of the battle against the ongoing
climate crisis. Gilio-Whitaker provides an essential description:
Indigenous peoples worldwide became more visible
as it became apparent that they, along with more
vulnerable peoples in the undeveloped, Indigenous,
and fourth world, were on the frontlines of climate

Water Protector Prisoners, Water Protector Legal Collective,
https://waterprotectorlegal.org/water-protector-prisoners/.
307 Complaint, Anna White Hat et al. v. Jeff Landry et al., at 23, 26, (M.D. La.,
May 22, 2019).Complaint, Anna White Hat et al. v. Jeff Landry et al., Case No.
3:19-cv-00322, *23, *26 (M.D. La., May 22, 2019).
308 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
309 See infra Part IV.
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change, even though they had been excluded from
international processes like the Kyoto Protocol.
Grassroots movements and organizations emerged
from Indigenous communities all over the world,
bringing attention to the effects climate change, the
fossil fuel industry, and government collusion were
having on their communities.310
Due to the combination of environmental racism and
colonialism, Indigenous peoples have been pushed into the position
of being the first responders in the climate crisis. The blend of
historical sidelining, colonialist expansion, and environmental
racism ensure that any laws constructed to combat any free speech
response to that climate crisis will by necessity have a disparate
impact on Indigenous communities. 311
VI.

THOSE LAWS THAT AFFECT YOU AFFECTED US FIRST
HOW SILENCING ONE SILENCES ALL

312:

The Dakota Access Pipeline arcs through North and South
Dakota and Iowa before coming to a stop in Illinois. The Keystone
XL pipeline, owned by TransCanada, begins near the border
between Alberta and Saskatchewan in Canada, gashing through
North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma,
before coming to a stop in Port Arthur, Texas. An awkward tail of
the Keystone XL angles off from Nebraska at Steele City, crosses
through Missouri, and ends in Illinois. Pipelines crisscross all over
the United States; whether they are above- or below-ground, they
are critical in many ways to the day-to-day function of the country.
Even as the climate crisis worsens, the water, oil, gas, petroleum,
and other chemicals that are transported every day via these
pipelines are critical to keep society running smoothly.
At the time of this writing, more than thirty states in the U.S.
have drafted and proposed anti-protest bills.313 Of those thirty states,

GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 118-19.
Id.
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A ache, P
Pe e Ca a g ,
#40DaysOfAction Washington DC Rally Livestream June 23, 2018 (at 25:57),
https://www.facebook.com/anewppc/videos/1735225803240254/.
313 US Protest Law Tracker, INT L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT L.,
http://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker/ [https://perma.cc/HZE7-5UGN].
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eight states enacted critical infrastructure laws.314 Three more
critical infrastructure/anti-protest bills are pending in Ohio,
Missouri, and Illinois.315 As more states craft critical
infrastructure/anti-protest bills, more people will be arrested,
charged, and convicted under unconstitutional legislation. Further
development of critical infrastructure legislation in its current form
would likely continue the trend of unconstitutionally infringing on
First Amendment rights to free speech and freedom of association
should people continue to protest the installation of pipelines,
fracking, or other projects involving dangerous fossil fuels.
Wh e O ah a HB 1123, N h Da a SB 2044,
S h Da a SB 189, Te a HB 3557, L
a a HB 727, a d
the federal Pipelines Act unconstitutionally target Indigenous
peoples in their application, those same laws are facially
nondiscriminatory. To be clear: all six of the laws analyzed in this
paper are written in a way that chills not only the free speech of
Indigenous activists, but of any activist. While they are currently
being applied most strictly to Indigenous activists, and were created
in response to Indigenous environmental activism, they have already
been applied to both Indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. Karen
Savage, a non-indigenous journalist, was arrested at the same time
as Anna White Hat. 316 So was Ramon Mejía, a social studies teacher
in Biloxi, Mississipi who also protested the Bayou Bridge
Pipeline.317 Hundreds of people were arrested at Standing Rock,
Indigenous and non-indigenous alike. As described by GilioWhitaker:
The #NoDAPL protest at Standing Rock was
precedent setting on numerous fronts, not the least of
which for the degree of collaboration between Native
and non-Native people it inspired. For the better part
of a year, non-Native Americans poured out their
support in social and news media, with financial and
other donations . . . and side by side risked their lives
with Indian people, braving brutal police attacks,
Id.
Id.
316 Complaint, Anna White Hat et al. v. Jeff Landry et al., at 8, (M.D. La., May
22, 2019). Complaint, Anna White Hat et al. v. Jeff Landry et al., Case No. 3:19cv-00322, *8 (M.D. La., May 22, 2019).
317 Id. at *8, *23.
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harassment, and jail.318
Since Standing Rock, and as the climate crisis worsens, more
and more people have been protesting against pipelines and for
environmental justice. As environmental justice continues to be
indigenized, environmental racism continues to be challenged, and
critical infrastructure sites continue to be picketed, people from all
demographics will be swept under the application of these
unconstitutional laws. Combating the climate crisis through the
courts will continue to foster opportunities for free speech actions.
The highly anticipated case of Juliana et al. v. United States et al.,
which argues that the U.S. government has long been aware of the
danger to the public from fossil fuels and carbon dioxide pollution,
could have vast consequences for the future of environmental law
and safety in the U.S. It could quite particularly have an impact on
Indigenous environmental justice, as one of the main cores of
Juliana a g e
ha [ he U.S. g e
e ] ec e
allow[s] interstate and international transpo f f
f e de e
the danger it presents to the world. 319 However, as Juliana sits in the
Ninth Circuit, state and federal legislators continue to wield the oil
industry as a weapon against constitutional rights. 320
Each of the laws discussed in this paper were developed
deliberately in response to the #NoDAPL protests at Standing Rock.
Standing Rock a groundbreaking protest not only due to the
massive blend of Indigenous and non-indigenous peoples protesting
at the site, but also due to the sheer number of Indigenous
communities that served as Water Protectors was a watershed
moment in the history of the United States. 321 As the climate crisis
worsens and more and more states propose and pass laws which
criminalize free speech and protest, that kind of mass political action
will likely repeat itself. The risk that is presented by the chilling of
Indigenous free speech cannot be overstated. While it has been made
clear that these critical infrastructure/anti-protest laws are targeted,
GILIO-WHITAKER, supra note 5, at 110.
First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Kelsey
Cascadia Rose Juliana et al. v. The United States of America et al., at 62, (D.
Or., Sept. 10, 2015). First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, Kelsey Cascadia Rose Juliana et al. v. The United States of America et
al., Case 6:15-cv-01517-TC, *62 (D. Or., Sept. 10, 2015).
320 O
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, Juliana v. United States, OUR CHILDREN S TRUST,
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/juliana-v-us [https://perma.cc/KED6-ELEY]
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not in writing but in practice, at Indigenous peoples and Indigenous
activists, the consequences of these laws are absolute. When the
ce f e g
a e e ced, he a d f
, a he f
a ge f g e
e e e
e e he a . 322
VII.

MOVING FORWARD: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The Supreme Court precedent is clear. The only solution to
the unconstitutionality of these critical infrastructure/anti-protest
laws is to suspend enforcement of them until each clause is analyzed
and the unconstitutionally overbroad or overly vague clauses are
severed from the statutes. 323 Similarly, both state and federal
lawmakers must be careful to prevent the use of such vague and
overbroad clauses in future. The risk to the First Amendment is too
great for laws like the ones described in this paper to remain as they
are.
However, the suspension and clause-severing required by
Reno and Hicks will only resolve one issue presented by these laws
when they are examined in their overall context. Each of these six
laws infringe upon the First Amendment rights of Indigenous
peoples in the United States, but in so doing they, and the
legislatures that created them, continue a tradition of repressing
Indigenous tribes.324 The framework used by state and federal
governments in the U.S. is one which subjugates Indigenous peoples
and denies them access to their civil and human rights. 325 If that
framework is not changed, those governments will continue to enact
laws which repress Indigenous peoples. The framework must be
rebuilt, and the structure is already available.
One of the premiere documents regarding the rights (both
international and civil) of Indigenous peoples has been UNDRIP.326
The United States has yet to ratify this declaration, even if it has
endorsed it.327 However, Articles 2, 18, and 32 clearly carve out
ACLU, Freedom of Expression, https://www.aclu.org/other/freedomexpression [https://perma.cc/7ZX3-YBGV] (using hate speech as an example of
indivisible free speech).
323 ACLU, 521 U.S. at 844; Hicks, 539 U.S. at 113.
324 See infra Part II, Part IV.B.
325 See generally ECHO-HAWK, supra note 80.
326 G.A. 61/295, 2007 Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Oct. 2,
2007).
327 Admin., US Acts on UN Rights of Indigenous Peoples Declaration, PINE
TREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE (Jul. 26, 2011, 6:56 AM),
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space for the U.S. to reshape its current jurisprudence, on both the
state and federal level, to end judicial violation of Indigenous civil
rights. These Articles state:
Article 2.
Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and
equal to all other peoples and individuals and have
the right to be free from any kind of discrimination,
in the exercise of their rights, in particular that based
on their indigenous origin and identity . . . .
Article 18.
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in
decision-making in matters which would affect their
rights, through representatives chosen by themselves
in accordance with their own procedures, as well as
to maintain and develop their own indigenous
decision-making institutions . . . .
Article 19.
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with
the indigenous peoples concerned through their own
representative institutions in order to obtain their
free, prior and informed consent before adopting and
implementing legislative or administrative measures
that may affect them . . .
Article 32.
1 Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and
develop priorities and strategies for the development
or use of their lands or territories or other resources.
2 States shall consult and cooperate in good faith
with the indigenous peoples concerned through their
own representative institutions in order to obtain
their free and informed consent prior to the approval
of any project affecting their lands or territories and
other resources, particularly in connection with the
development, utilization or exploitation of mineral,
water or other resources.
3 States shall provide effective mechanism for just
and fair redress for any such activities, and
https://ptla.org/wabanaki/us-acts-un-rights-indigenous-peoples-declaration
[https://perma.cc/YFW8-9VRS].
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appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate
adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or
spiritual impact.328
At the time of this writing, the U.S. has not ratified UNDRIP
into enforceable law. Doing so would require an action by the
Senate, which in the current climate seems unlikely.329 However,
should these concepts be folded into U.S. law, laws which would
negatively impact Indigenous rights, particularly those laws that
impact their land or resources, could not be developed.330 It would
enable, instead, the development of laws that both acknowledge
Indigenous civil and human rights and prevent the violation of
their right to free speech.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The history of stifling Indigenous rights in the United States
is, effectively, the history of the United States. The conquering and
systematic, genocidal destruction of the many thousands of
Indigenous communities across North America has been termed
he I d a
a ,
f ed h gh Ma fe De
, a d
continued on in policies of boarding school indoctrination,
allotments, and termination. In the current decades, Indigenous
activism has pushed forward every aspect of the environmental
justice movement and has forced it to confront its own imperialistic
and capitalistic roots. It has also resulted in some of the greatest
moments of free speech and protest of this generation, with the
actions by Water Protectors at Standing Rock, Line 5 in Michigan,
the Bayou Bridge in Louisiana, and many other places. As a result,
state and federal legislatures and agencies have begun pushing
unconstitutional agendas of their own, which not only have the
impact of chilling free speech and freedom of association for
political advocates and agencies, but particularly pointedly of
Id. at Art. 2, 18, 19, 32.
Kate Sullivan et al., Pelosi calls McConnell Mosco Mi ch for blocking
legislation, CNN (Aug. 14, 2019, 9:44 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/14/politics/moscow-mitch-mcconnell-nancypelosi/index.html [https://perma.cc/Y79S-AVK4].
330 See Admin., US Acts on UN Rights of Indigenous Peoples Declaration, PINE
TREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE (Jul. 26, 2011, 6:56 AM),
https://ptla.org/wabanaki/us-acts-un-rights-indigenous-peoples-declaration
[https://perma.cc/YFW8-9VRS].
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Indigenous peoples. These laws are unconstitutional both on their
face and in their application. They violate the First Amendment by
chilling the rights of free speech and of association and violate the
Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by denying U.S. citizens the liberty to associate with
those they choose. Critical infrastructure/anti-protest laws target
Indigenous peoples through their application and continue in a long
tradition of the stifling or outright robbery of the civil and human
rights of Indigenous peoples in the United States. If these laws
continue, it will not just be Indigenous people that are impacted by
these laws. In fact, these laws are already impacting non-Indigenous
people; hundreds of people were arrested at the #NoDAPL protests
at Standing Rock, not all of them Indigenous.331 As these laws
expand, more and more people will be arrested for exercising their
constitutional rights. Without protections, it could soon be the entire
Indigenous environmental rights movement caught up in the
crossfire.
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